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R.L.M / FORSCHUNGSAMT

15(T)

15 (T)

Extract from:

APPLE PIE (BRITISH) PAPERS

JIC(Germany)47/40 "VIOLET" SERIES

PAPER NO I

ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE ON USSR AS CONDUCTED BY THE

FORMER FELDWIRTSCHAFTSAMT

" (i) Wireless Intercept

Wireless interception is of the greatest importance in a country so large as Russia, where long distance telephone communications are bad and where radio communication is extensively used between factories and their respective Volkskommissariats. The German Wireless Intercept Service of the Air Ministry Research Department (Forschungsamt) was under the direction of Fliegerstabsingenieur GUTTLER - Ob d L. GL/A/RÜ/IV (Oberkommando der Luftwaffe General Luftzeugmeister Ausland Rüstung IV). Its service proved invaluable and it was able to intercept wireless messages from and to the following "Peoples' Kommissariats" of the Soviet Union:-

Home Defence (Landesverteidigung)
Armament (Bewaffnung)
Tank Industry
Mortar Industry
Munitions Industry
Machine Tools Industry.

These communications were between the various Kommissariats and the factories and undertakings under their control. Details of the Kommissariats and of factories and products were in cipher and locations were very rarely given. The deciphering and evaluation of these wireless communications entailed a comprehensive knowledge of each special field. The messages usually dealt with difficulties in delivery of raw materials, power, half-finished products, dates of delivery, production figures and testing of new types of armaments, etc. (NOTE: It was as the result of such a wireless intercept that it was known that Russia had developed a new type of aircraft six months before this aircraft actually appeared on the front).

Many names of directors, engineers, personnel, etc. occurred in these communications and this new information was utilized to amplify further the personnel index which had already been compiled. The attachment of personnel to certain factories was ascertained and an index of the 'cover' names of factories was also compiled. "

W.S. 126.

1st

31

Minute Sheet.

Reference No. :

I/85/8201.

TOP SECRET.

Subject : GOEBBELS' DIARIES.

Halford of the Foreign Office wrote to us in April this year on this very subject and I .... enclose a copy of my reply.

If it is necessary, for the purposes of a further note for the F.O. files I suggest a shortened version as follows:-

1. Of the six separate German organizations working on the breaking of foreign traffic it is the Forschungsamt to which Goebbels refers on page 142 of his diary.

This organization was founded and directed by Goebbels himself and was previously concerned with work on diplomatic systems.

2. As far as British diplomatic systems are concerned there is no evidence that the Germans were reading high-trade traffic other than Interdepartmental Cypher which was broken as the result of a compromise of the basic book in Norway in 1940. Their success with our high-trade diplomatic systems was otherwise negligible and was based almost entirely on physical compromise.

/3.

Referred to

AD(0)

(Copy to:-

L.91.)

After Action

3. It is thought that the mention of Ankara and Moscow refers not to British traffic but to Turkish diplomatic systems on these links.

4. The allegations of carelessness have not been confirmed by interrogation reports, the general view being that British diplomatic systems were singularly unproductive. This is borne out by Ministerialrat SEIFFERT's statement that Russian and, secondly, French traffic provided the most valuable intelligence.

(Sgd.) R. DUDLEY-SMITH.

DL.
6th July, 1948.

 1016

XXX 13,

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET. 7th May, 1948.

Ref: 85/6910

Dear Halford,

Cooper has passed on to me your letter of 20th April concerning references in GOEBBELS' diaries to the work of the "Research Office".

2. There were six separate German organisations working on the breaking of foreign traffic, of which three concerned themselves primarily with work on diplomatic systems - the O.K.W., the Auswaertiges Amt, and the Forschungsamt. It is the last of these to which Goebbels is referring.

3. The RLM/Forschungsamt was founded and directed by Goering, mainly for his own political purposes, and was deeply imbued with the spirit of Nazism. Its members have proved less amenable to interrogation than those of other German organisations. A number of them were, however, interrogated by us in 1945, including Ministerialrat SEIFFERT, who is specifically mentioned by Goebbels.

4. As far as British diplomatic systems are concerned, there is no evidence that the Germans were reading high-grade traffic other than Interdepartmental Cypher, which was broken as the result of the compromise of the basic book in Norway in 1940, and which was still in use in April 1942. It is likely that a certain amount of useful information was obtained in this way. The Forschungsamt was also reading Foreign Office "R" Code and Government Telegraph Code, which were, of course, not intended to provide security against cryptanalytic attack.

A.S. Halford Esq.,
Foreign Office.

Copy to: L.91. /5.
J. Cooper Esq.
Eastcote.

5. The reference to Ankara and Moscow probably refers not to British traffic but to Turkish diplomatic systems on those links. It is known that Turkish traffic between Ankara and London was broken by the Germans and provided them with valuable intelligence throughout the war.

6. As to Goebbels' statement (28th April, 1942) that we were "exceedingly careless in these matters", this is not confirmed by interrogation reports. SEIFFERT, who was head of the Intelligence Department in the Research Office, was asked which traffic provided the most valuable intelligence, and replied "Russian". Second to this he placed French. Other prisoners stated that British diplomatic systems were in general singularly unproductive.

7. To conclude, while the Germans achieved undesirable successes with our Service cyphers in the earlier years of the war, their success with our diplomatic systems was negligible, and was based almost entirely on physical compromise. It seems either that Goebbels was misled, or that, in view of the consistently anti-British rather than anti-Russian tone of his diaries, he seized upon any success with British systems to bolster up his own convictions.

Yours sincerely,

(SGD.) R. DUDLEY-SMITH.

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FOREIGN OFFICE,

S.W.1.

20th April, 1948.

TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL.

Dear Cooper,

I do not know whether you have looked at the Goebbels Diaries which have just been published in this country. There are a good many references in them to the "Research Office" which seems to have been Eastcote's German equivalent. There is a claim that the Research Office was able to read our cyphers and there are various derogatory remarks about the slackness of our cypher procedure.

We should be interested to have your comments on this continued Goebbels boasting from the other side of the grave!

Yours ever,

(Sgd.) A.S. Halford.

J. Cooper Esq.

15 (t)

28

SECRET

TICOM/I-207

REPORT ON INTERROGATION OF MAJOR DIETRICH G.

VON TRUETZSCHLER OF THE RLM/FA.

Attached is a report on the interrogation of Dietrich G. von TRUETZSCHLER of the RLM/FA., received via M.I.8, War Office.

2. TRUETZSCHLER has now been released from internment in Category III, which entails some restriction of movement and occupation. P.W. is, therefore, still available for further interrogation, if required, provided that no further arrest is entailed.

3. In view of the fact that P.W. left the RLM/FA in 1935 further interrogation is unlikely to be very fruitful but he might be able to clarify points of historical interest. Requests for further interrogation should be addressed to TICOM.

No. of Pages: 8

TICOM
27th September, 1947.

Copy No: 10

Distribution :-

L.S.I.C.

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11-12. Z.06
13. Mr. Martin.
14-17. Ticom Files.

U.S.

18. U.S.L.C.
19-22. Op-20-2.
23-26. A.S.A., Washington. } via U.S.L.C.
27. Director, A.S.A. Europe. }

SECRET

REPORT ON INTERROGATION OF P.W. No. 551461
von TRUETZSCHLER Generalmajor DIETRICH, on
the FORSCHUNGSAMT of the REICHSLUFTFAHRTMIN-
STERIUM.

---

1. P.W. HISTORY.

12th June 1885.	Born at DORFSTADT in VOGTLAND.
1905.	Matriculation. Joined Sachs. Feldartl. Regt. 12.
1906.	Commissioned.
1914 - 1917.	Regtl. service on Western Front.
1917 - 1918.	1b of 23 Res. Div. 1b of 12 Res. Korps and 1b of 241 R.I.D.
1919.	With Korps EVERHARDT in Baltic countries.
1920.	Rittmeister beim Stabe with Reiterregiment 12. Resigned (?) as a result of Kapp-Putsch.
1920 - 1933.	Insurance broker at BERLIN.
August 1933. - December 1935.	Official in FORSCHUNGSAMT of R.L.M.
1936.	Ic Luftkreis v MUNCHEN.
1938 - 1939.	Luftflotte 2.
1939 - 1940.	Q1 Luftgau XI.
1940 - 1941.	Quartiermeister, and organiser ground services Luftgau NORWEGEN.
1941 - 1942.	Similar function in FINLAND.
1942 - 1944.	Cmdr. of FLUGHAFENBEREICH, STAVANGER.
1944.	Oberquartiermeister Luftflotte REICH.

2. SHORT APPRECIATION.

P.W. hails from a very old family of large estate owners in SAXONY. Had very exclusive education. It is likely that P.W. had to leave the Army because he had been disloyal to the Republic during the Kapp-Putsch. Life as an insurance broker went very much against the grain, and humiliations and difficulties experienced did much to embitter him, and contributed to draw this ultra-Nationalist and militarist into the Nazi wake.

From details of P.W's civil career he would appear unscrupulous and an opportunist, and this impression is confirmed by the post he obtained in the FORSCHUNGSAMT. P.W. was probably driven on very much by an ambitious, socially zealous and Nazified wife, but also by the urge for economic security. Although P.W. appears at present not to be very mentally alert, it should be remembered that he has held positions in the Luftwaffe which required much organisational ability. The impression may therefore be somewhat deceptive. P.W. asserts he had to leave the FORSCHUNGSAMT, because he asked for promotion. Again, he did NOT do so until he had the prospect of a post in the Luftwaffe proper, where he was fairly certain of promotion, and safer from Gestapo attentions than a mere civilian. P.W's slightly different assertion is rendered later in the

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report. The information supplied by P.W. is very incomplete. This may be due to :-

a) Lack of memory.
b) The 12 years elapsed since 1935.
c) Fear on the part of P.W. to prejudice his own position by giving fuller information.
d) Incompleteness of his own knowledge on FORSCHUNGSAMT explained in the body of the report.
e) Lack of co-operation.

3. LOCATION.

The F.A. was first at BEHRENSTRASSE 5 in BERLIN. When the F.A. expanded it moved to the SCHILLERSTRASSE. (P.W. believes this was in the Autumn of 1934). The F.A. was in a block of buildings at the end of a cul-de-sac which could easily be closed. The cul-de-sac came out near the place where the Schillerstrasse makes a right-angle bend.

4. RECRUITING OF PERSONNEL.

P.W's nomination was proposed to the leader of the F.A. Ministerialrat SCHIEPF by his friend and compatriot BOEDECKER, former Naval Captain and Zeppelinpilot. P.W. was appointed and instated directly by SCHIEPF. In the beginning appointments were mainly made on personal recommendation. Later, candidates were carefully vetted by Gestapo, who carried out all the necessary investigations. Apart from this, every applicant had to bring two recommendations by well-known personalities. With the increase in numbers of personnel its cultural level fell considerably, according to the P.W.

ORGANISATION AND DUTIES.

The F.A. consisted of five main groups, see chart. The F.A. was directly subordinated to GOERING who had delegated its supervision to KOERNER. Orders were issued only by GOERING, and for the Gestapo by HIMMLER or HEIDRICH.

GROUP I. Was in charge of organisation, administration, personnel, internal affairs, guarding and security of premises, courier service etc. The group leader SCHAPPER was at the same time deputy F.A.-leader.

Group I functioned as a sort of HQ Coy. for the small F.A. HQ, to which von TRUETZSCHLER was added later, in charge of registration.

SCHAPPER. Was of medium height, fair, sharp features. He was an ambitious careerist who belonged originally to the ABWEHR.

Obr. BERGGREN. Was a reliable, capable, supporter of SCHAPPER. BERGGREN was tall and slim, fair, normal ordinary face. He was in charge of finances, personnel and administration.

GROUP II. This group dealt with the data and results supplied by the Groups III to V, compared these results with known events or circumstances, and drew up the necessary reports. Complete reports were sent daily to HITLER, GOERING and Stattssekretär KÖRNER. Extracts from information went to leaders of other Reich-departments, but in each separate case only with the contents relevant to their particular department. Group-leader was Obr. SEIFERT, according to P.W., a sympathetic, confidence-inspiring personality. He was of medium height, stout, dark-blond, round faced. Former signals-officer. His right-hand man was JACOBSEN, former Naval Officer, tall, slim, dark-blond, sharp features, age approximately 30, smart, nimble and cheerful.

GROUP III. During P.W's term of service with the F.A., this group was still very small. The F.A. leader personally performed part of the group's

Please turn over

duties and special tasks. Members of Group V to which P.W. belonged, were hardly ever in touch with Group III personnel. P.W. claims that he does NOT even know whether a group leader existed in the early stages, and if so, who he was.

GROUP IV. Under Oberregierungsrat SCHROEDER dealt with coding and decoding. To Group IV were submitted all ciphered messages which were passed to Group II in clear.

The leader of Group II O.B.M. SCHROEDER came from the A.B.[illegible]. He was of medium height, dark, made the impression of a "professor", like his first assistant von RECZNIEWSKI also of medium height, dark, an artist by nature.

GROUP V. When P.W. joined this Group it consisted of 12 - 15 persons at most which number was soon increased, because of the three shift duty (0800 - 1600, 1600 - 2400 and 2400 - 0800). Consequently one got to know well only one's shift-mates. P.W. assesses at 60 the total staff at the time he left the F...

The group's duties consisted of telephone, telegraph and radio monitoring. The F... had its own receiving station. For telephone monitoring the necessary wire-connections were effected by the REICHSPOSTMINISTERIUM. A special official with two or three assistants was entrusted with this job, secrecy and security thus being more or less assured. As far as P.W. knows the various exchanges were not aware that lines were being monitored by the F... The connections were made partly in the so-called "SCHALTKELLER", partly in cable-inspection boxes (KABELSCHACHTEN), the latter in the case of trunk-lines (FERNLEITUNGEN).

The group leader O.B.M. BOTTGER was small and scraggy, dark, prominent nose. He was an adaptable and not very energetic person of approximately 40. He dealt with technical questions rather than with monitoring results. His secretary was a divorced Mrs. SPORKEN, who soon quitted to re-marry. (P.W. thinks in the Spring of 1935) a certain von LEVITZOW.

BOEDECKER. In charge of telephone monitoring, was then approximately 30, of medium height, rather stout, dark-blond, extraordinarily smart and efficient, but was subject to periods of inebriety when he was unfit for duty. For this reason he quitted, but soon found a post in the REICHSWEHRMINISTERIUM (Personal Abtg. Mannschaftsersatz). BOEDECKER was replaced by BOETTGER's main support and chief of monitoring, GLOEDNER, former Naval Officer. He was a blond and handsome man of approximately 30, loyal to his fellow workers and concerned about their welfare. He was often ill. P.W. believes him to have died since from some ailment. Other personnel in telephone monitoring were :-

JACOBI. Former officer, small, thin, blond. P.W. believes that he quitted in 1935.

[illegible]. S... Sturmführer, small, blond, tenacious, a rough customer, but honest and decent. Left at the same time as P.W. (December 1935).

SCHROEDER small and lean, dark, quiet and reserved. Had worked for many years for a Dutch firm in Further-India.

POPP. Tall, slim, fair, in his early twenties. Sudeten-German.

[illegible]. Tall, fair, pale oval face, quiet and reliable.

In 1935 monitoring posts COLOGNE, MUNICH and DRESDEN were planned. [illegible] was intended as leader for COLOGNE.

Listening was ordered from case to case by GOERING, HIMMLER or HEYDRICH. The latter in so far as P.W. knows only gave orders where police investigations were concerned.

Please turn

On no account was it allowed to watch V.I.P's such as Cabinet Ministers, State Secretaries, High Ranking Officers, High Party Officials, etc., without specific orders from GOERING.

Everything which was heard by employees of Group V had to be reported. This, however, was impracticable as each person had to supervise a board with twenty connections. The recordings went to Group II. The staff was precluded from entering the rooms of any other group. Therefore, notes were passed on through a special system of pneumatic tubes. To this end conversations were noted down in copying books. The second copy was always passed on, whilst the original, the master-copy, remained with the recorder.

It was also prohibited to talk shop outside the offices of the group. Many private persons were monitored, who were frequently changed for others. P.W. never got the impression that private interests were pursued in the issue of orders for monitoring. P.W. has NOT heard to the contrary from colleagues.

Among the persons observed there were many women who were suspected of espionage or relations with foreign personalities. The emphasis during 1933 and 1934 was on home policy, and internal affairs. For instance :- The staff of ROEHM, many other S.A. Führer and the HQ of von PAPEN were monitored for a long time. P.W. cannot remember any listening to von SCHLEICHER or persons of his entourage, nor any listening of Gestapo, Abwehr or Police. P.W. does NOT know whether in particular Group and Department Chiefs did any personal ultra-secret watching.

During the critical days of June 1934 the whole staff was kept mobilised in the building for its defence. It was the particular duty of Group V to detect through telephone monitoring ROEHM's whereabouts, to which no special clue was available. One of the people belonging to the F.A. rang up ROEHM's WIESSEE residence. As ROEHM answered personally, the order was thereby executed.

REGISTRATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF REPORTS.

After P.W. left Group V he was put in charge of the registration of the reports drawn up by Group II. The reports first passed through the Duplicating Department which produced the required number of copies. A man named HABERKORN was responsible for this work. He was of medium height, very fair, round faced, very fresh complexion, age then approximately 30 years, a former marine, the type of a good NCO. P.W. met HABERKORN again at STAVANGER (Norway) in 1943 or 1944, and that as an officer of the "Seenotdienst" (Naval Rescue Service) insofar as P.W. can recollect "H" had left the F.A. before the war. Resuming the description of the routing of documents: The duplicated reports of which each page was carefully numbered, were entered on lists by P.W. and locked into courier brief cases by him. The respective recipients of the reports had duplicate keys to these cases. The couriers travelled in small cars. The couriers had standing orders to reclaim the reports of the preceding day on surrendering the fresh reports.

When HITLER and GOERING were outside BERLIN couriers followed them by train in urgent cases.

Regular submission of reports was made to HITLER, GOERING, Gestapo, Abwehr, Auswärtiges Amt, Reichsluftfahrtministerium. P.W. had NO assistance for registration and despatching. He generally received his reports so late that, for lack of time, he could not possibly read through them, the time available being taken up wholly by the minute registration.

Principal courier was MOHSCHEIN an S.S. Sturmführer and a former private in the marines.

Please turn over

Description: Medium height, very dark, reliable, good N.C.O.

He quitted the same time as L..

Only the reports emanating from Group II went through L.'s hands.

All other mail, entries and exits went through Group I or through SCHAFFER's own hands.

Group I in certain ways formed the staff of the HQ of the ABWEHR and did all the normal routine work. SCHLIF personally only disposed of one woman secretary.

SCHLIF. The ABWEHRIV.

A handsome chap; lively eyes, knowing the ways of the world, of quick perception, idealistic (sic), cheerful and energetic. Had been employed in the Abwehr for a time. He enjoyed the full confidence of his subordinates of the F.A.. He had an early death, alleged suicide in a BRESLAU hotel in the night before GOERING's marriage to EMMY SONNEMANN, left a serious void in the F.A.. Nothing was known of the real motives. It was said that a woman was involved who had passed the night with him in BRESLAU. P.W. thinks that if SCHLIF's death was not due to suicide, his elimination can only have been effected by the Gestapo or people connected with it, perhaps because SCHLIF was too well informed (sic). P.W. rules out the Abwehr which was not popular with the Regime, and which would never have thought of thus exposing itself. Furthermore the F.A. and SCHLIF himself were in daily touch with the Abwehr.

SCHLIF's successor :-

PRINZ CHRISTOPH VON HESSEN.

Was in no way able to replace his predecessor. He was tall and lean, dark with a narrow pointed face, without assurance and cowed, and could only be regarded as the nominal head of the F.A.. He was completely under the influence of KOPKOW with whom he previously worked. Social obligations took up much of Christoph's time and energy.

L.'s EXIGENCIES.

The prospects offered upon entering the F.A. concerning promotion and pay were disregarded. Requests and remonstrances were unsuccessful. An attempt to be heard at a higher level led to an intervention by ST.-[illegible] KOERNER and to the dismissal of approximately 20 employees among them was L.. However, P.W. was given the opportunity to tender his own resignation. L.W. complains about the tyranny and atmosphere of suspicion which [illegible] introduced into the F.A..

Members of F.A.

Personnel of the F.A. who did not yet belong to the S.A. or the S.S. were ordered to join the S.S.. For this a special "Sturm" was organised consisting solely of F.A. personnel. The Abwehr, Group Ausland-Fleet was united in the S.S. and was then made to accompany out their function. (Abwehrkommando, Abwehr, Ausland).

F.A.'s Finances.

Although dependent on the F.A. itself, it is remarkable, that a plan to provide future independence of L.A., to remove the remit of the Abwehr and to remain free was being.

Fleet Abwehr :-

The leading personalities in the F.A. were SCHAUMB, who in F.W.'s opinion was an ambitious and ill-disposed chief, so that the relations between him, the F.A. leader and the personal suffered.

"Leaving the S.S. was more difficult than resigning from the F.A. It was clear that leaving the S.S. would have had further dangerous consequences for somebody in possession of valuable secret knowledge.

I therefore seized the opportunity to join the L.W. as an "E" officer. An old friend, Lt. General von CRIEGERN, who had been re-instated and worked in the Luftkreis DRESDEN, supported my application which was accepted only after half a year's delay, with an additional probationary period of three months.

My service in the F.A. was disregarded, and did NOT count as service in the L.W. When I was accepted as an "E" officer, my S.S. membership was automatically cancelled, as I wanted it to be.

After my quitting of the S.S., I broke off all connections with all personnel of the F.A.".

SOME NOTES ON A SUPPLEMENTARY INTERROGATION.

There was increased mutual spying and supervision in the F.A. In at least one of the rooms, and P.W. believes in many more, a microphone was concealed through which the personnel's unguarded talk could be surprised. P.W. believes that the listening-in was done by Group III. Since Group III, which ran all agents (VERTRAUENSMAENNER), was isolated in one block by itself, and since P.W. knows no names, or declines to state them, this group presumably dealt with all highly confidential matters and may have held most of the power in the F.A.

Group II made a special study of decoding wires from and for the Russian Embassy and trade organisation, and according to P.W. generally succeeded. Many persons who had direct or indirect connections with Russian offices were monitored, and P.W. believes that as a result some Hamburg firms were wound up.

Gradually most of the F.A. work, P.W. says up to 70%, degenerated into low-grade spying for the Gestapo. For this, the F.A. received orders generally from HEIDRICH and sometimes from HIMMLER. Among persons monitored, P.W. mentions HUGENBERG, DUESTERBERG, SELDTE, and other important Stahlhelm leaders.

The ADLON Hotel and the Hotel KAISERHOF were monitored, the latter mainly during the Spring of 1934. Francois PONCET, the French Ambassador, often spoke from the ADLON, but P.W. cannot remember that anything of importance was ever surprised. Further the public telephone boxes in the Governmental district were monitored.

Since the ADLON alone had thirty lines which were constantly monitored, it is understandable that the percentage of interesting results was very low.

P.W. says that he was thoroughly disgusted, but economic fear kept him in his job, which was comparatively well paid. P.W. says he finally felt monitored.

P.W., who by his descent and mentality, can have little intrinsic sympathy with the Nazis, in spite of a wife who was already a Nazi in 1928,

FORSCHUNGSAMT OF R.L.M.

[redacted]: Ministerialrat SCHMIDT, later Prinz Christoph von HESSEN

Registration and Despatch: von TRUETZSCHLER
Deputy Leader of F.A. : SCHAEFER
Group I Leader : Oberregierungsrat SCHAEFER — Hauptkurier [redacted].
2 i/c : OBR BERGGREN.

x
x

Personnel Branch
Internal Affairs
Administration

x
x
x

x
x

GROUP II
[redacted].
[redacted] i/c [redacted]
Collation and elaboration of reports and enquiries.
Duplicating of reports.
([redacted]).

GROUP III
OBR ???
Special Investigation and Agents.

x
x

GROUP IV
OBR SCHROEDER.
2 i/c v. PECZNICZECK
Coding and Decoding.

x
x

GROUP V
OBR BOETTCH.
Frau STOLTEN
2 i/c [redacted]
later [redacted].
Monitoring and supervision of Telephones, Telegraph, Wireless Communications.
v. TRUETZSCHLER.
JACOBI.
[redacted].
POPP and MUELLER.

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L.91/15(T)/3561.

Major A. Masters,
M.I.8.

Von TRUETZSCHLER, D.S.

Thank you for your MI8/E/81 of 10th September, 1947.

2. The question of further interrogation is still under discussion with ASA Washington but I think you may rest assured there will be nothing likely to entail rearrest.

L.S.I.C.(L.91)
12th. September, 1947

W.S. 126.

Rec'd. 15.7.47
Reg. No. A 1397
File No. 85

(26)

Minute Sheet.

Reference No. : L.91/15(T)/3488

Subject : Von TRUETCZSCHLER, DIETRICH G. MAJOR

I think the attached report is of sufficient historical interest to issue in the Ticom/I series, particularly in view of the American historical requirements.

2. Since he left the RLM/FA in December, 1935, further interrogation of the subject is unlikely to be worthwhile but possibly we should refer para 2 of M.I.8's covering note to Washington ?

Victor L. Rolf

for L.91
15th July, 1947.

* Being issued as Ticom/I-207

Referred to

*

LDL 17/7.

Yes, a wise ...

After Action

A964.

Tel. No.—WHItehall 9400 Ex. 1554

Any further communication on this subject should be addressed to:—
The Under-Secretary of State,
The War Office,
Hotel Victoria,
Northumberland Avenue,
London, W.C.2,
and the following number quoted.

Your Reference M.I.8/E/81

THE WAR OFFICE,
HOTEL VICTORIA,
NORTHUMBERLAND AVENUE,
LONDON, W.C.2.

8 July, 1947.

L.91.

Memorandum for:

The Director,
L.S.I.C.

Von TRUETZSCHLER, DIETRICH G. MAJOR

1. The enclosed interrogation report on the above named, who is an internee in Germany, is forwarded for your retention.

2. Would you please let us know, as soon as possible, if you have any further interest in subject.

Captain, G.S.
for Lieut. Col. G.S.

TICOM/I-20

Tel. No.—Whitehall 9400.

Any further communication on this subject should be addressed to :—

The Under-Secretary of State,
The War Office,
London, S.W.1,
and the following number quoted.

M.I.8/E/81.

15(T) M.I.8. (25)

THE WAR OFFICE,
LONDON, S.W.1.

TOP SECRET

10 September, 1947.

L.91

Memorandum for:-

Director,
L.S.I.C.
(for attention S/Ldr. V.E. Rolf.)

E24

von TRUETZSCHLER, D.G.

Reference your L91/15(T)/3496 of 21st July, 1947 and further to our M.I.8/E/81 of 8th July, 1947.

1. B.A.O.R. state that above-named individual has been released from internment in Category III.

2. This category entails some restriction of movement and occupation, and he is therefore available for further interrogation, provided he does not have to be re-arrested. A very good reason would have to be supplied if he were to be re-arrested.

3. Will you please state as soon as possible if you wish a further interrogation to be made.

for Lieut.-Colonel, G.S.

(24)

I.91/15(T)/3496

SECRET

G.C.H.Q.

Captain Hawes,
M.I.8.

See E25

Thank you for your MI8/K/81 dated 8th July, 1947. This report is of considerable historical interest particularly to the Americans. In view of the fact that subject left the RLM/FA in December, 1935, his further interrogation is unlikely to be fruitful but it is intended to issue this report in the Ticom/I series and to refer the question of further interrogation to A.S.A. Washington. It would be advisable, therefore, to hold him available for possible further interrogation at a later date.

DCR.

18th July, 1947.

(23)

L.91/15(2)/3488

Von TRUETCHLER, DIETRICH G. MAJOR

M18/E/41

I think the attached report is of sufficient historical interest to issue in the Ticom/I series, particularly in view of the American historical requirements. DL

2. Since he left the RLM/FA in December, 1935, further interrogation of the subject is unlikely to be worthwhile but possibly we should refer para 2 of M.I.8's covering note to Washington ?

VKK.

for L.91
15th July, 1947.



[illegible] October 1946. MTA.

[illegible] of PAN/FA were not allowed to speak [illegible] Soviet with the Italians, the Germans and Scandinavians [illegible] to speak much, such as the conversations between the Swiss and the Italians, they made no mention of them to their own colleagues. The members were fond of the Italians and Italian customs, and therefore knew little of many of the points on which he was questioned.

Concerning ciphers of the Embassies generally, he said that at first they used mainly the old Italian procedures, such as Code book A, B, C, which were read by them 99%. They also introduced an enciphering system, which they called "Chiocchi" procedure, consisting of a keyword, for which the alphabet was shifted in various ways. This cipher is [illegible] the substitution system, which again was introduced from the previous Italian government. Later, the system was modified, so that the simple monalphabetic tables were replaced by a new ten period table substitution tables. This was used with a new basic criterion, which differed from all previous Italian tricks, in that not only the pages from 1-5 or 1-6 appeared, but all the numbers except 000 were included. This system had 2 groups at the beginning of the text, which indicated the starting-point in the enciphering table. The favourite starting-points were 13 or 14, 75 and 75 (!). Unfortunately there was insufficient material, and they were received except depth to establish, so that the messages could not be read.

They also received corrupted messages, which could not be explained owing to the poorness of the network; from certain signs, however, it appeared to be a "confused, broken-up multiple".

The first intercept group dealt with [illegible] code text. [illegible] enciphering table (Chiocchi or Singles cipher); the second intercept group the results of the first gave the starting point.

He knew nothing of actual communication traffic, except that some messages were read, and nothing of any diplomatic systems.

Hemmick had tried to assess the Fascist regime, but without success; there was no personal relation between Hemmick and the FA. Although some sections (intercept stations) had previously to work with the SI and the Secret or technical collaboration (use of some cables, etc.) the FA always tried to maintain itself as a very party basis.

He did not know whether the United SS had its own cryptographic department, but thought that the SD probably had a section for handling agent's ciphers.

The FA had some contact with the Foreign Office; whereas the SIS [illegible] concentrated on the analytical side, while the FA specialised in breaking code books. He had had considerable success with Italian cipher systems. Officially in liaison with the FA, but with departmental control of code affairs was through their military contact with the Foreign Office, the FA had a liaison staff at Rome as well as other countries. Similarly, both the FA and [illegible] had their intercept stations, and passed material to the Foreign Office.

His knowledge of relations with foreign countries, and was unable [illegible] were worked with them; there was no personal exchange with the Italians through either the Foreign Office, and he knew that the Italians [illegible] worked with Germans.

He knew nothing of Hungarian, and other [illegible] but the Italians [illegible] with the Turkish side of the [illegible]

He began [illegible] to quit in the [illegible]

(21)

15(T)

With reference to L.I.I.C.'s minute D2/15(T)/2067 of 3rd July, 1946 from Commander Dudley Smith we enclose herewith Triembacher's answers to your questionnaire.

Director L.I.I.C
(or ~~Mr. Martin~~)

C91.

We have not kept a copy for our files as the information does not seem to be of direct interest to us.

L.I.I.C.2.
8th October, 1946.

TRIEMBACHER, Karl,
Duisburgerstr. 181.,
Duisburg-Hamborn.

Ich war im Forschungsamt, Hauptabteilung IV tätig. Diese Abteilung war wie bekannt von sämtlichen anderen Abteilungen des Amtes hermetisch abgeschlossen, das heißt Angehörige anderer Abteilungen hatten zu ihr nur in den seltesten Fällen Zugang. Ausserdem durften die Angehörigen der Hauptabteilung IV über ihrer Arbeit, mit Ausnahme der jeweiligen direkten Vorgesetzten, nur mit dem Führer, den Reichsmarschall, und Staatssekretär KÖRNER sprechen. In besonderen Fällen, zum Beispiel Korrespondenz zwischen Duce und Führer durfte nicht einmal mit den eigenen Kollegen darüber gesprochen werde. Ich selbst bekleidete in der Hauptabteilung IV nur die Stellung eines Referatsleiters (Italien und Vatikan), bezw. die eines Stellvertretenden Gruppenleiters (Gruppe 8 B, Italian, Vatikan und Rumänien). Ich hatte daher nur einen kleinen und begrenzten Einblick in die gesammte Arbeit des Amtes und kann daher die von mir geforderte Beantwortung der gestellten Fragen nur in so fern ausführlich beantworten, in soweit sie mit meiner Arbeit direkt in Zusammenhang stehen.

1). Genaue Beschreibung der Diplomatisbhen Geheimschrift Verfahren der Badoglio Regierung während der Zeit der Mitkriegführung an der Seite der Allierten.

Antwort. Die Italienische Badoglio Regierung bediente sich Anfangs im starken Umfang der alten Italienischen Verfahrens, so z.B. das T.B.,A.R.38, wurde nach wie vor stark benutzt und von uns zu 99% gelesen. Ferner führte die Badoglio Regierung ein neues Notverfahren ein, das von uns mit " Chiodelli - Verfahren" bezeichnet wurde. Dieses bestand aus einem Schlüsselwort, nach welchem das Alphabet jeweils verschoben wurde . Als Hauptverfahren der Badoglio Regierung kann man das Wurm-Verfahren bezeichnen. Auch dieses Verfahren wurde von der vorherigen Italienischen Regierung übernommen. Erst später erfuhr das Verfahren in sofern eine Änderung, als die einfachen Zusatzüberschlüßlungstauschtafel durch eine neue doppeltbelegte T.T. 10 ersetzt wurde. Diesem Wurm-Verfahren lag ein neues T.T. zu Grunde , das sich von den bis dahin üblichen italienischen T.B. in sofern unterschied, als es nicht nur die Seiten von 1 bis 5 bezw. von 1 bis 6 aufwiess sondern die Hunderter-Seite voll besass und nur die 800ter Seiten fehlten.

Das Wurm-Verfahren hatte am Anfang der Sprüche jeweils 2 Gruppen, welche die jeweilige Einsatzstelle die für diesen Spruch im Wurm-Block gültig war anzeigte. Die beliebtesten Einsatzstellen waren 13 bzw. 14 ,73 und 95 (?). Leider war das anfallende Material zahlenmäßig sehr gering sodass eine für die Lösung notwendige Tiefe selten erreicht wurde und daher die Sprüche nicht gelösst werden konnten.
Vereinzelt gingen auch Sprüche ein,deren annalytischen Untersuchung wegen der zu geringen Anzahl der vorhandenen Sprüche nicht einwandfrei möglich war. Jedoch ist anzunehmen- uzw. auf Grund einzelner Merkmale - dass es sich um ein kombiniertes,zerrissenes Wurm-Verfahren handelte.

Erläuterung.

B.T. - Buchstaben-Tauschtafel. (Schlüsseltafel).
T.B. - Tausch-Buch (Code).
B.T. 10. - zehnstellige Buchstaben-Tauschtafel. (zum Unterschied einer hundertstelligen Buchstaben-Tauschtafel).

Beispiel der Erkennungsgruppen des Wurm-Verfahrens: --

(Die ersten beide Gruppen eines Spruches).

1 Gang : Entschlüsslung der Buchstaben Gruppen durch die doppeltbelegte B.T. 10. Ergebnis = Zahlengruppen.

2. Gang: 1 Gruppe= Zahlen- Chi-Text minus Konstante ergibt Seitenspiegel des T.B. (Impero bzw. Impero-Nuovo).

2 Gruppe= Zahlen- Chi-Text minus Ergebnis der ersten Gruppe (Seitenspiegel),ergibt Einsatzstelle.

Die Addition bzw. Subtraction erfolgt symbolisch, das heißt, die Übertragung der Zehner erfolgt nicht.

2). Beschreibung des Englischen Handelsverfahrens bzw. was über die erziehlte Erfolge bekannt ist.

Antwort. Ich bin nicht in der Lage darüber Auskunft zu geben,da ich darüber so viel wie nicht informiert bin. Ich weiß nur,dass Sprüche gelesen wurden,weiß aber nichts über deren Verfahren.
Das selbe gilt für die Fragen 2b, 2c, 2d, 2e.
2f. Ist mir ebenfals nicht bekannt,nur weiß ich,daß bei einem Verfahren

Verfahren ein umfangreiches T.B. zu Grunde lag,welches eine mehrfache Belegung hatte,d.h. bei dem die einzelnen Gruppen eine mehrfache Bedeutung hatten.

3). War GOERING am RLM/FA persönlich interessiert.?

Antwort. GOERING war der Chef des Amtes ,d.h. das Amt war seiner Kompetenz unterstelt. Staatssekretär KÖRNER war von ihm beauftragt sich für das Amt einzusetzen. Das Amt unterstand also nur dem Führer und GOERING.

4). Beziehungen HIMMLER's zu RLM/FA.

Antwort. Es war im Amt bekannt,dass HIMMLER wiederholt versucht hat das Amt als solches unter seine Kompetenz zu bekommen. Die jeweilige Versuche blieben jedoch immer Erfolglos. Zwischen dem Amt und HIMMLER bestanden keine persönlichen Beziehungen,obwohl einzelne Aussenstellen (A und B = Aufnahme und Beobachtungsstellen) aus technischen Gründen,hin und wieder zu einer Zusammenarbeit mit dem SD bzw. mit der GESTAPO kommen mussten. (zB Benutzung gleicher Kabelanschlüße und änliches).
Wie ich schon früher mal bemerkte,hat das Amt immer grossen Wert darauf gelegt, ein unparteiisches Amt zu sein,das nur den einen Zweck verfolgten, der Regierung und Staatsführung die best möglichsten Informationen diplomatischer und wirtschaftlicher Art zu geben.

5). Verfügte die Waffen SS über eine eigene Entzifferungs-Abteilung ?.

Antwort. Darüber ist mir nichts bekannt, jedoch ist anzunehmen,dass die Waffen SS - als militärische Einheit - über eine militärische Entzifferungsabteilung verfügt haben wird.
Wohl hatte der SD bzw. das Sicherheitshauptamt eine eigene Entzifferungsabteilung,die sich jedoch wahrscheinlich hauptsächlich mit der Entzifferung von sogenannten Agentenverfahren befasst haben wird.

6).a. Welchen Umfang hatten die Beziehungen des Forschungsamtes zur Entzifferungsabteilung des Auswärtigen Amtes und umgekehrt ? .

Antwort. Die Zusammenarbeit zwischen dem F.A. und dem A.A. erfolgte nur in einem gewissen Umfang. Es wurden Erfahrungen auf beiden Seiten ausgetauscht,wobei Anfangs beim A.A. der Schwerpunkt auf dem annalytischen Gebiet lag,während er beim F.A. auf dem Gebiet der

Lösung von T.B. (Tauschbücher) lag. Mit den Jahren konnte auch das F.A. über annalytischen Verfahren verfügen und umgekehrt hatte auch das A.A. durch Zuweisung eines ausgezeichneten Entzifferers, der durch den Anschluss Österreichs übernommen wurde, auf dem Gebiet der Lösung von T.B. gute fortschritte gemacht. Dies versteht sich nur für die Italienische Sektor. Die weitere Zusammenarbeit mit meinem Referat und dem A.A. erfolgte späterhin aus Gründen der Rationalisierung und Zeitersparnis. Wohl ist mir bekannt, dass auch die anderen Referaten mit dem A.A. zusammen arbeiteten jedoch weiß ich den Umfang nicht da ich mich dafür nie interressiert habe. Ich selbst habe immer mit Oberregierungsrat PASCHKE zusammen gearbeitet.

6B7. Welchen Umfang hatten die Beziehungen des FA zur OKW/Chi und umgekehrt. ?.

Antwort. Von einer direkten Entzifferungstechnischen Zusammenarbeit zwischen der Hauptabteilung IV des F.A. und der Chi-Abteilung des OKWs kann man nicht reden. Wohl bestand eine enge Zusammenarbeit zwischen OKW und A.A. ,deren Vorteile dem F.A. durch das A.A. zum Teil auch zustatten kamen, wobei die Ergebnisse der Zusammenarbeit des A.A s mit dem F.A. wiederum der OKW zustatten kamen. Die hierbei günstigste und müheloseste Position hatte ohne Zweifel das A.A. Das F.A. hatte auch wie bei allen Ministerien im OKW einen officielen Verbindungs-stab stationiert, durch den jeweiligen Informationen weiter geleitet bzw. in Empfang genommen wurden.

7). In welchem Umfang erfolgte ein Austausch von Rohmaterial, welches augefangen wurde ,zwischen dem F.A. und anderen Entzifferungsämter

Antwort. Sowohl das F.A. als auch das OKW verfügten über zahlreiche eigene Auffangstellen. Das auf beiden Seiten, auf dieser Weise aufgenommene Material ging vom F.A. dem A.A. bzw. OKW und vom OKW dem A.A. bzw, F.A. zu. Es konnte sich so ergeben, dass der gleiche Spruch sowohl vom OKW als vom F.A. aufgenommen vorlag.

8a). Welche Verbindung bestand zwischen dem F.A. und den folgenden Ausländischen Entzifferungs-büros. ?

a). Japanisch. Antwort: Mir nicht bekannt.
b). Finland. Antwort: Mir nicht bekannt.
c). Ungarn. Antwort: Mir nicht bekannt.

Frage 6 d.

d). Österreich before dem Anschlüss.
Antwort: Mir nicht bekannt.

e). Spanien. Antwort: Ich glaube possitiv zu wissen, dass kein Austausch erfolgte.

f). Italien. Antwort: Periodischer Austausch über OKW bzw. A.A. wobei zu bemerken ist, dass auch zwischen Italien und Bulgarien ein Austausch erfolgte, der wiederum teilsweise Deutschland (über OKW) zuging.

9). Welches waren die Dienstbelange von ORR. Huppertsberg und ODEN.?

Antwort. Mit ORR HUPPERTSBERG hatte ich persönlich in meiner Tätigkeit nichts zu tun. Ich glaube dass ihm der Ansatz oblag. Über Regierungsrat ODEN weiß ich, dass er als Ingenieur mit der technischen Einrichtung und technischen Anlagen zu tun hatte. Nähere Einzelheiten bin ich nicht in der Lage zu geben.

10). Was ist Ihnen über die Versuche und Erfolge auf dem Gebiet des Unterwasserkabels bekannt.?

Antwort. Es ist mir nur weitläufig bekannt, dass ähnliche Versuche unternommen werden sollten, bzw. unternommen wurden. Jedoch weiß ich nichts über deren evtl. Ergebnisse, da ich mich - als Entzifferer- damit nie beschäftigt habe.

Zu schematischen Darstellung 1938 ist zu bemerken, dass es mir unmöglich ist nähere Einzelheiten zu entsinnen um so mehr, als der bereits damals geplante organisatorische Umbau des Amtes in der zwischen Zeit erfolgt ist. Referate gab es damals nicht.

Zu schematischen Darstellung 1945 muss ich bemerken, dass ich genaue und precise Angaben nur über die eigene Abteilung machen kann. Über die eigene Hauptabteilung sind Angaben nur im grossen Umrissen und über sonstige Amtsleitung nur vereinzelt möglich.

Durch den Krieg hat das Amt auf dem Wege der Dienstverpflichtung, die wegendes grösseren Material-Anfalles notwendig waren, einen grösseren Umfang angenommen, der jedoch bereits in den letzten Jahren aus Sicherheits - und Geheimhaltungsgründe reduciert wurde. Die Aussenstellen des FAs die sehr zahlreich und über ganz Deutschland, bzw. besetzte Gebiete verbreitet waren, verfügten über ein sehr umfangreiches Personal. Ich kann jedoch darüber keine genaue Angabe machen.

A M T S L E I T U N G (1938).

Leiter: Zuert Kapitän SCHIMPF, danach Prinz von HESSEN.

ABT. 1.	ABT. 2.	ABT. 3.	ABT. 4.	ABT. 5
Verwaltung.			Entzifferung.	Auswertung.
Leiter: BERGREEN.	Leiter: BRÄUER.		Leiter: SCHRÖDER.	Leiter: SLIFERT.

GRUPPE A.	GRUPPE B.	GRUPPE C.	GRUPPE D.
Leiter: WÄCHTER.	Leiter: PAETZEL.	Leiter: WENZEL.	Leiter: v. REZNICZECK.
England, America, Spanien.	Frankreich, Schweiz.	Russland, Baltische Staaten, Polen.	Italien, Vatikan, Rumanien.

A M T S L E I T U N G (1945)

Leiter: Zuerst Prinz von HESSEN, danach SCHAPPER.
Stellvertreter: (SCHRÖDER).

HAUPT.ABT. I.

Verwaltung.

Leiter:
BERGREEN.

Stellv.:
(Rosenhahn).

HAUPT.ABT.II.

Aussendienst-stellen A- & B-.

HAUPT.ABT.III

HAUPT.ABT.IV.

Entzifferung.

Leiter:
SCHRÖDER.

Stellv.:
(Paetzel).

HAUPT.ABT.V.

Auswertung.

Leiter:
SEIFERT.

Stellv.:
(Kurzbach).

ABT. 6.

Leiter:
PAETZEL.
Stellv. (Lehr).

Annalytische Abteilung.
(10 Personen beschäftigt).

ABT. 7.

Leiter:
WÄCHTER.
Stv. (Matthies).

England,
America,
Spanien,
Portugal,
Turkei, Persien.
(70 Personen).

ABT. 8.

Leiter:
SCHULZ.
Stv. (Haumer).

ABT. 9

Leiter: WENZEL
Stellv: ?

Russland,
Polen,
Baltische Staaten,
Finnland.

(40 Personen).

8. A.

Leiter: HAUMER.
Stellv: SCHMIDT.

8. B.

Leiter: ENGELKE.
Stellv: TRIEMBACHER.

Ref. 8. A. 1.

Leiter: SCHMIDT.
Stellv: (Arens).

Schweiz
(7 Personen).

Ref. 8. A. 2.

GASPER.
(Hellmann)

Frankreich,
und Kolonien.
(16 Personen)

Ref. 8. B. 1.

TRIEMBACHER
(Ding).

Italien,
VAtikan.
(20 Personen)

Ref. B. 2.

ENGELKE.
(Hertz).

Rumänien.
(6 Personen)

SECRET

(20)

AZ/4153

Lt.-Col. Aldridge.

Reference your MI3/K/476 of 12th July, 1944, enclosing a copy of a report by EARL [illegible] of the [illegible] We have already received this report through M.I.6 channels and have recently forwarded to them a detailed questionnaire for [illegible].

Your copy is returned herewith as requested.

Alfred Nall.

14th July, 1944.

L.91.

Tel. No.— WHItehall 9400

Any further communication on this subject should be addressed to :—
The Under-Secretary of State,
The War Office
(as opposite),
and the following number quoted.

MI8/E/476
Your Reference

MI8,
THE WAR OFFICE,
WHITEHALL,
LONDON, SW1.

12 July, 1946

SECRET

Memorandum to :-

The Director,
LSIC
(for attention H)

1. Enclosed herewith is a report in German by Karl TRIEMBACHER, received from GSI(S) BAOR.

2. Triembacher apparently served with the Forschungs Amt (Research Dept) where he worked mainly on certain Italian diplomatic ciphers which are briefly described on page 2.

3. We should be obliged if you would return the attached report as convenient, together with any comments you may wish to make and, particularly whether you will have any further interest in Triembacher.

L.91.

Captain GS.
for Lieutenant-Colonel GS.

Official

2 15 (T)

condition.



Kabe wrote in OKW 1151 40, FA 1140 ff as an evaluator - gave general list of causes of [illegible] from various sources. Doubt if it would tell us anything new. Not worth publishing

L.

10/5/45

B 15 (7)

TOP SECRET 15 (T)

AFO 787
4 June 1945

SUBJECT: Letter of Transmittal

TO : Capt. Collins, to be issued to [redacted]

1. There is forwarded herewith for your information in the handling of matters relating to Signal Intelligence activities.

[redacted]
Colonel, Signal Corps
Director

Incl: Enclosure above

[redacted]

TOP SECRET.

Herbert Rahn
Kronberg/Taunus
Goe[illegible]estrasse 1
Tel. Kronberg 259.

Kronberg/Ts., 3./6.1946.

Skizze über meine OKW-Tätigkeit.

1) Personalien:

Geboren 8./3.1900 zu Frankfurt a/Main, Vater war Prokurist bei der I.G.-Farbenindustrie, Oberrealschule bis zur Primareife, merkantile Schulausbildung bereits ab Sexta (= 4. Schuljahr), kein Parteigenosse, von den Parteigliederungen gehörte ich nur der DAF & NSV an, geschieden, 2 Kinder.

2) Kurzer Lebenslauf:

Teilnahme am 1. Weltkrieg als junger Infanterist im Jahre 1918. Geschäftliche Tätigkeit ab 1919 als Kaufmann in Deutschland & ab 1920 im Ausland bis etwa 1935. Ansässig gewesen in England, Frankreich, Holland & Schweden. Ich arbeitete dort selbständig, mich ausschliesslich meinen geschäftlichen & privaten Interessen widmend. Weite Geschäftsreisen liessen mich auch andere europäische Länder besuchen, wie Tschecho-Slowakei, Oesterreich, Schweiz, Ungarn, Finnland, Norwegen, Dänemark, Belgien, Luxemburg & den Balkan. Ich hatte hierbei Gelegenheit durch engen Kontakt mit meinen Geschäftsfreunden in diesen Ländern in reichem Masse auch persönliche Beziehungen zu Land & Leuten sowie deren Kulturkreisen im weitesten Sinne des Wortes zu bekommen; vor allem aber auch wirtschaftliche & politische Beobachtungen zu machen.

3) Vormilitärische Ausbildung:

Zur neuen Deutschen Wehrmacht stiess ich erstmals etwa 1937 in Berlin anlässlich der Neuaufstellung der Militär-Stammrollen; ich wurde aufgrund meiner Sprachkenntnisse (englisch, französisch, holländisch, schwedisch, norwegisch, dänisch, flämisch & afrikaansch) & meinen Auslandserfahrungen z.b.V. (=zur besonderer Verwendung) gestellt, machte 2 militärische Ausbildungskurse mit, die sich hauptsächlich auf die Erlernung militärischer Fachausdrücke in der englischen & französischen Sprache erstreckten.

4) Militärische Tätigkeit ab 1939 im 2. Weltkrieg:

Am 26./8.1939 wurde ich zum OKW in Berlin W.35, Tirpitzufer einberufen & in der Nachrichtenabteilung der Chiffrierstelle eingesetzt.
Dort eingehende Meldungen wurden nach ihrem
a) militärischen,
b) politischen,
c) wirtschaftlichen &
d) feindpropagandistischen

Inhalt resp. Wert hin geprüft & ausgewertet.

TOP SECRET.

TOP SECRET

Herbert Rahn
Kronberg/Taunus,

den 3./6. 1946.

Skizze über meine OKW-Tätigkeit.(Fortsetzung)

Die Meldungen kamen:

a)aus dem Helldienst(=hauptsächlich Agenturmeldungen wie Reuter, United Press, Havas etc),

b)von eigenen Radio-Empfangsanlagen im Hause Tirpitzufer & vor den Toren Berlins, ausserdeutschen Rundfunknachrichten aus der ganzen Welt & von allen nur erdenklichen Wellenlängen, wie z.B. London, Paris, Stockholm, Hilversum, Übersee etc,

c)durch Abhören des drahtlosen, internationalen Privat- & staatlichen Telefonverkahrs,

d)von den sogenannten H-Stellen (=Horchstellen) der Wehrmacht, die unabhängig von denen des Heeres, der Luftwaffe & der Marine arbeiteten & in verschiedenen Teilen des Landes & in den besetzten Gebieten je nach den günstigsten Empfangsverhältnissen Nachrichtenmaterial lieferten,

e)von den ABP & ATP (=Auslandsbriefprüf- & Auslandstelegrammprüfstelle) übermittelt wurden,

f)vom Forschungsamt (RLM) & dessen in-& ausländischen Filialen eingingen,

g)ferner von den verschiedenen Abwehr-Abteilungen im gleichen Hause kamen; darunter auch Eilmeldungen & Berich- von V-Leuten (=sogenannte Vertrauensleute) u.s.w.

h)dechiffriertes Nachrichtenmaterial aus der Stammabteilung (=von OKW/CHi = Chiffrierstelle),

i)von der Funküberwachung, die im In- & besetzten Ausland überall eingerichtet war.

Den Nachrichtenextrakt, untergliedert nach genannten Gesichtspunkten a) - d) von Seite 1 unten plus "Verschiedenes" brachte man im Schnelldruckverfahren zu Papier, Es wurde nach einem bestimmten Verteiler in die verschiedenen Abteilungen in & ausser Hause (wie z.B. Führerhauptquartier, Wehrmachtführungsstab, Abwehr je nach Art des Inhalts usw.) in mehrfachen Lieferungen während des Tages & der Nacht weitergeleitet oder von den betreffenden Stellen abgeholt. Sehr oft, besonders in den ersten Kriegsmonaten, wurden auch eilige Sondermeldungen oder Übersichtsberichte in Druckgegeben oder telefonisch vorab weitergeleitet.

TOP SECRET

Herbert Rahn
Kronberg/Taunus

TOP SECRET -3- den 3./6. 1946.

Skizze über meine OKW-Tätigkeit.(Fortsetzung)

Ich wurde im Sommer 1940, nachdem die Feldzüge gegen Polen, Frankreich, Holland, Belgien & in Skandinavien beendet waren, nach der ABP & von da nach der ATP & dann ins Forschungsamt (RLM) versetzt, überall dort auswertend & hauptsächlich auf dem merkantilen Sektor des Nachrichtenwesens arbeitend, teilweise auch als Spezialist auf dem Gebiete der Schiffahrt & des internationalen Güteraustausches.

Im Frühjahr 1943 wurde ich vom Forschungsamt (RLM) in meinen zivilen Beruf wieder entlassen & war dann bis Kriegsende in der Rüstungsindustrie (VDM-Halbzeugwerke in Frankfurt-Heddernheim & in einer Konzern-Schwesterfirma) kaufmännisch tätig.

Irrtum & Auslassungen vorbehalten, jedoch nach bestem Wissen.

(Herbert Rahn)

SECRET

[illegible]

[illegible]

With reference to your minute of 11th ultimo, I think in the circumstances Mr. Tarrant, regarding full clearance of the GC&CS/Secret Intelligence, your copy of the report is returned herewith; the delay is regretted.

2. I would be very grateful if the following questions could be put to [illegible]; it will probably be most satisfactory if he answers them by writing 'Transmade', his original manuscript in German being sent here :-

1) Describe in detail your work on the "Enigma" co-belligerent Italian diplomatic system.

2) Describe what you know of work done and connection with :-

a) British Commercial System.
b) Bank of England.
c) Irish Diplomatic.
d) British Diplomatic.
e) British Intergovernmental system.
f) American Diplomatic.

3) Did anyone take a personal interest in the SIS/GC.

4) Was relation and influence [illegible] here ever the SIS/GC.

5) Did the Italian G.C. have a cryptographic party of its own.

6) What was the extent and degree of liaison between the SIS/GC and

a) The crypto bureau of the aforementioned (name it)
b) SIS/GC.

7) To what extent did the SIS/GC avail [illegible] the other crypto bureaux.

8) What liaison, direct or indirect, existed between the SIS/GC and foreign crypto bureaux -

a) Japanese.
b) Finnish
c) Hungarian.
d) Austrian (before [illegible]).
e) Spanish.
f) Italian.

9) What were the duties of [illegible] and name in the SIS/GC.

10) What do you know of work done and connection between [illegible] activity in Mediterranean theatre.

11) Have you [illegible] during the organisation of the SIS/GC in 1919 and 1924, giving names of chiefs and deputies of Sections, Directors and approximate numbers of people employed in same.

I.I.I.I. (I.91)
3rd July 1945.

Copy in file 1945. (Copy to :- L).

DS 15(T)

APPENDIX A.

LIFE STORY

I was born on 13/6/13 in München, son of the chief engineer Josef TRIEMBACHER and his wife Martha VONBUN.

My father was a specialist in air and gas compression and worked with LINDE in München and then as chief engineer with HEYLANDT in Berlin.

Due to my father's work the last mentioned firm expanded so much that the LINDE firm saw it best to buy up the HEYLANDT firm. Whereupon my father, who had at the time become involved in a law-suit with the LINDE firm, took up a technical appointment at Genoa (Italy), as technical director of the S.A.G.I.C. (Societa-anonima gas industriali compressi.) and here he founded his own Import and Export office. And so it came about that I spent my youth in Italy. I attended the Italian Elementary School where I did very well, being the only foreigner to receive a Prize of Honour (Diploma and medal). I then attended the Technical School in GENOA, where I did very well also. I then attended the German School in Genoa (Ginnasium) to learn the German language.

At the end of 1931 we left Italy, and after a short stay in Germany entered the service of the Russian Government. My father took over there a post as advisory engineer for air and gas compression, with the Peoples' Commissariat for heavy Industry, I being his assistant. In this capacity I had the task to see that my father's instructions were carried out, that the time limit for the material arriving and contracts being fulfilled was kept and in addition, I helped with a few constructions. We lived at Moscow, but had to travel to the various works Leningrad, Karkov, Tambow, Corlowka, Magnetogorsk, etc.

At the end of 1933 my father's contract expired and my father, in spite of the Russians' request, did not want to prolong his stay, and so we went back to Berlin in December 1933. Here my father worked on some projects for plants to produce Nitrogen and Ammonia for the Japanese Government, I helped him with this, My father could not accept the post offered him in Japan as the German Government would not permit it.

In June I entered the service of the F.A. (Forschungs-Amt or Investigation Office) where the second part of my life begins, for I learnt there a new career - deciphering code for the German Secret Service. My first chief was Freiherr von REZNICZEK, son of the well-known German composer, who at that time led the Italy branch. This office was at the time just being formed, and I was the 160th member. The present Chief-departments were at that time just departments and the present departments were merely groups. Department IV at that time (now Chief Department IV) was concerned merely with deciphering of diplomatic messages and only very seldom dealt with so called Agent matters, as these were solved by the Gestapo and only turned over to us if exceptionally difficult. Also the coding system of the Italian Government was very simple up to the time of the introduction of the 'WURM' system. (which was probably introduced by the Russian ambassador when he fled from Bucharest). The former code consisting of a 100 placed BIGRAMM-KEY which was changed daily or every three days and furthermore of alphabetic and partly non-alphabetic codes.

Studies coding (orig. German)
from MI 3/E/476 of 12.7.46
ADI Director

The solving of the codes was at that time the only difficulty as there was no one beside my chief von RETNICZEK who was in a position to solve them. (von R. came from the O.K.W.) I slowly specialised for this work too and attained a comparatively high grade. Whereas it formerly took 2 years to solve my first code, I managed to reduce the time until I finally could break down a code in 4-8 weeks, depending on the material available.

In 1937 a 4 weeks decyphering course was arranged for the F.A., which was managed by my chief von RETNICZEK and by Dr. PETTEL. (Specialist in analytical matters). I was among the twenty pupils. At the beginning of 1938 I was made REFERENT for Italy and at the beginning of 1942 REFERAT-LEADER of the 8 B I (in the same group as I started in) and had, in the meantime, been raised to Dept 8., consisting of groups 8bA and 8 B, which were subdivided into Referate 1,2,3, etc.

The manager of group 8 was, as my former chief died, O.R.R. SCHULTZ. The group leader of 8 A. was R.R. HAUER and of 8 B. R.R. ENGELKE.

As R.R. ENGELKE was very much occupied with the creation of Referat 8 B 2 (Rumania) I was made deputy group-leader and in the last years managed the group almost entirely.

It should be noted that the post of group, department, or Chief-department leader was a very pronounced position of Power. The referat Italy was built up and developed by me and I succeeded in getting a comparatively good staff to work with me. Chief dept. IV was strictly seperated from all other depts. and Chief dept. and no member of another department was allowed to enter our rooms. As the Foreign Office took a lot of trouble with the decyphering of diplomatic messages, there was a certain amount of liaison between us. In cases of emergency the Minister of State secretaries always fell back on the F.A. We finally got the title of KRIEGSENT-SCHEIDENDEN INSTITUTE (War-decesive). This title was actually the result of a particular change. In September 1943 all superfluous offices and their staffs were to be done away with. Our request to have this altered were without result and everyone had to report on the 8th Sept. at the Berlin Collection-camp, to be taken to RADOM to serve as soldiers. By chance the PUTSCH, in the Mussolini Government, took place on the same day and various German Branches could not get the required information as 80% of the F.A. were no longer working.. By order of Hermann GÖRING the various F.A. members (we were just embarking) were sent straight back to their services and not until later - and then only the superfluous ones, mostly of the administration branch - were released for Military Service. Various ministries, especially the Foreign Offices worked hand in hand with the F.A. For example when the Italian ambassador received orders from Rome about any matter, and had to report to the German Foreign Minister, the latter received from us the appropiate information and could therefore have an advantageous position over the visitor, as he was better informed. It occured quite often, that the Italian ambassador in Berlin of Rome asked for the message to be repeated, it was illegible, whereas we had the same message already deciphered and on the tables of the appropiate minister even before the repetition came through. Of course, in spite of the strictest control, more than one indescretion occured, in particular when unchecked documents were given to the Press.

And so, for example, it happened that more than once the verbal content of diplomatic despatches, which at times dealt with extremely acute problems, were made public by the Press, because the Propaganda Ministry had proceeded contrary to rules laid down. For the edition offices (for press material) had strict instructions never to publish the verbal text of any diplomatic dispatches but should always alter it as was necessary.

Due to the outbreak of war our office took many men, eligible for Military Service, by which the number of employees of the office, including the many A and B 'Stellen' rose to many thousands. In November 1943 the 'Berlin Zentrale' situated in the Schillerstrasse 116-124, Berlin-Charlottenburg was destroyed by a direct hit during an air-raid and completely burnt-out. This office then went to its emergency quarters in Breslau, which had been prepared for it. Chief-departments I, II, III and V were transfered to Breslau-Klettendorf, prepared for it. In Jan. 1945 the F.A. had to leave Breslau, because of the approaching Russians and all unnecessary material was burned - I myself supervised this. (It is to be noted that we had a big dump of duplicated at Templin in our B. 'Stelle' there.) A special train brought us from Breslau to Berlin. A collection point was arranged for the F.A. at Juterbog, as we were now to go to Kaufbeuren/Allgau. A skeleton staff of about 50 men remained in Berlin to 'bridge over' the time necessary for the Kaufbeuren to be made ready. I myself received the order in Juterbog to go to Templin (as this position seemed to be threatened) and to destroy all material of Chief Amt IV that was not absolutely vital. The vital stuff was then brought to Allgau in a special train.

In Kaufbeuren itself the F.A. took up quarters in the Fliegerhorst there.

It is to be noted here that Referat 8 B I had its activities shrunken as the use of codes was forbidden to the Badoglio Government by the British and to the Mussulini Government by the Germans and the office had only to deal with purely analytical investigations.

It was not until diplomatic codes were resumed by the two Governments, that the Referat could resume its old activity, when I myself managed in the very short time of 8 weeks to break down the new Mussolini code (I 32 B), although there was only the smallest material to work on. I also succeeded, after meticulous work, to reconstruct the Kenngruppe system of the Badoglio Government and to solve the new decodong table, which consisted of a double laid 10 placed changeable table.

Although the basic code was solved, we were not able to read the messages, as a piece of information necessary to solve the 'Wurmblock' could not be obtained.

An investigation made by me, to make it possible to increase the amount of material received, showed that we were already receiveing 80%-90% of the Italian diplomatic material, so that it was not possible to alter that condition. Because of the threatening developements in the East and West it was seen that Germany might be split into North and South, the Reich Government forced the F-A to split into two independant organs, namely F-A North and F-A South, whereby F-A North, which was only a miniature F-A, was alloted to the Reich Government itself and F-A South which was to be chief F-A was to be attached to the new subsidary Government in the South.

I received, on the 11th April, the order from Dr. PETZEL to go immediately to Berlin to contact the already prepared skeleton staff (which was originally intended only for the time necessary for the Kaufbeuren office to be prepared).

The leader of the Berlin Bridge head, or as it was now F-A North, was Ministerialrat SEIFERT and the whole F-A group comprised merely 60 people in which every Dept. (Chief-Dept.) had its chief districts represented by Specialist points.

Chief Dept.IV (decoding) had a cypher for each of the most important countries. This small group of decoding experts was led by Dr.PETZEL, (whose representative I was),as a senior Referatsleader. On 21 April 1945 we left Berlin in a great convoy with the object of setting up our quarters with the A 'Stelle' at Eutin,Schleswig-Holstein,as the individual Government offices were also being set up there. But on May 2nd we had to leave there (after the technical facilities had been blown up) and move to Flensburg.. In Eutin the Gestapo had done its utmost to get the F-A North into its sphere of influence,but thanks to the superb tactics of our chief,SEIFERT,and the support of Government departments,this was avoided. I will comment that the attempts of the Gestapo,especially of the Reichfuehrer of the SS,to swallow the whole of the F-A,had been going on for a long time and that this had always caused trouble between our nominal chief,GÖRING,and the Reichsfuehrer of the SS.It can be said that almost all members of the F-A,viewed the prospects of being transfered to the SS with dismay,as formerly the activities of the office had been non-political and had only followed the object of getting for the appropiate Government offices,material necessary for the leadership of Government business and every member of the F-A looked upon his job as a purely scientific calling.

As we were being transfered from Eutin to Flensburg we were surprised by a dive-bombing attack,which caused us several casualties and loss of material belonging to the chief Dept.IV. (Codes and Cyphers).

On arrival in Flensburg the rest of the codes were destroyed by us ourselves,and the office only appeared now as Press office of the Government. Our news-sheet,prepared for the Reichsminister,Generals,Admirals,and DÖNITZ appeared twice daily and served now only to inform the people about Foreign Press and Wireless news as well as Military announcements. As the OKM in Flensburg/- the 4 Skl.III - had to stop its work because of the capitulation (its work was the same as the Chief Dept.IV of the F-A,but only dealt with Marine matters). It also turned into a Press office and kept the Admirals of the OKM informed. On DÖNITZ request the F-A joined forces with the Press office of the OKM. The F-A,as it did the most important work,took over the technical management.I myself,as my activities as decoder had ceased,was attached to the O.R.R.Dr.PETZEL as his representative. Dr.PETZEL now controlled the big translating office of the combined services. Because of the arrest of DÖNITZ and all those who had anything to do with him, the F-A,being in this class,dissolved.

I myself was not taken as I was not there at the time and could therefore continue in the Press office of the OKM and DMRL,as leader of the writing office. This press office entertained hoped of being taken over by the German News Service in Hamburg,and was kept because it was thought I could later become a correspondent in Paris.

But because of the fact that such activity abroad will be forbidden to us for a considerable time and the Press office as such would be dissolved,I saw myself obliged to look up my family in Hamborn where I am still living at the present time.

To conclude,I should like to say that I myself have never had any political activity,that I am a Catholic and married.I have two children,a boy of 10 and girl of 7.

During my activities in the F-A the decoration of the Sudetenorden was awarded me in May 1939. I received the Kriegsverdienstkreuz in December 1941. I was supposed to have been appointed Regierungsrat on the 9th of November 1945.

TRIEBACHER, Karl.

Referat 8 B I Italy

Tauschbücher

I	i	Z	RAI	Alphabetic
I	2	Z	RA2	
I	3	Z		Partly Alphabetic
I	4	Z	Zylli	
I	5	Z	Impero	
I	6	Z	ARI or YI	
I	11	Z		
I	16	B		
I	17	Z		
I	25	Z	AR25	
I	26	Z	H26	
I	28	B	AR28	
I	29	Z	AR29	
I	30	B	AR30	Non alphabetic
I	31	B	AR31	
I	32	B	TB Mussolini Government	
I	38	B	AR38	

Übergschlüsselungs - system

BT 100 (Drei-Tagesschlüssel,Tagesschlüssel and Sonderschlüssel)

Salzburg - system	Wurmverfahren (worms	Kenn-	0,25,50,et
Danzig - system	"	system)	gruppe	0,50,100et
Innsbrueck- system	"		mit Einsatzst.	

Notverfahren	(emergency system)	25 (Buenos Aires)	AR25 als Wurm
"	"	29 (Tokio)	AR29 benutzt
"	"	3Z (Lorenzo Marques)	13Z used as BT.

I 127 system (Budapest) 7stellige Additionsazahl

Explanation of signs;

I	= Zahlentauschbuch Italy No 4
I 28B	= Buchstabentauschbuch Italy No 28
BT	= Buchstaben Tauschtafel
TB	= Tauschbuch

Form R.1.—February, 1932.
(Revised, November, 1939).

A 221

DS 15(T)

CX .....
Source HS.
No. 9 AC 15
Date investigate & draft reply —

MINUTE SHEET.

DISTRIBUTION

The attached report on Karl TRIEMBACHER has been received from S.A.C.M. (reference IB/33/HT 6347 of 25th January, 1946).

If you have any questions to put to TRIEMBACHER would you let us know as soon as possible?

May the report be returned, please, as it is our only copy.

V.E.J. 8/2

Director
S.O.(C).S.

V.E.J.
8.2.46.

ACTION PROPOSED

REPORT ON INTERROGATION OF KURT SAUERBIER, OF RLM/FORSCHUNGSAMT, HELD ON 31 AUGUST, 1945

Attached is a report on the interrogation of Kurt SAUERBIER, a civilian employee of the RLM/Forschungsamt, Referat 9C, Hauptabteilung IV, conducted by Major W. P. BUNDY, U.S. Army, at DUSTBIN, SCHLOSS KRANSBERG, GERMANY, on 31 August, 1945.

Homework subsequently written by SAUERBIER will be issued shortly.

TICOM

2nd November, 1945. No. of pages: 4

DISTRIBUTION:

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7. Cdr. Tandy
8. Major Morgan

U.S.

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23. G-2 (via Lt. Col. Hillos)
24-27. A.S.A. (4) (via Major Seaman)
28. Director, S.I.D. USFET
29. Col. Kunkel, USSTAF.

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17-20. Ticom Files (4)

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30. S.A.C. for Section V.
31-33. Mr. Pritchard (3)

Report of Interrogation
of
KURT SAUERBIER
of RLM/FORSCHUNGSAMT, Referat 9C, Haupt
Abteilung IV at DUSTBIN, SCHLOSS KRAUSBERG,
GERMANY - 27th August, 1945.

For further references on this organization see TICOM I/25 and TICOM I/54.

Interrogator: Major William P. Bundy.

1. Subject. SAUERBIER is 41 years old, neat and anxious to impress. He joined the Forschungsamt in its infancy in 1935 on the strength of a knowledge of Swedish and some English. He has no special mathematical training or qualifications and was an ordinary bank clerk in a Hamburg bank, who was out of a job and heard that the FA was looking for men who knew languages. His poor manner of expression and the lack of conciseness and detail of his answers combined to give a total impression of distinctly mediocre ability and of an attitude typical of the entrenched civil servant, proud of his own little pew but seeing very little beyond it.

2. Career. There were only about a dozen cryptanalytic personnel in the FA in 1935. Subject took a short course in the fundamentals and then went to work on commercial code traffic. The head of the cryptanalytic section (later HAUPTABTEILUNG IV) was then, and remained, Min. Rat Dr. SCHROEDER.

In peacetime subject was concerned almost entirely with commercial codes in the German language. This involved the traffic of German firms to foreign countries during the 4-Year Plan. Another major undertaking was the code used by the Czech SKODA firm to IRAN and IRAQ in 1935. This was concerned with bridge-building projects almost entirely. Almost all of the work was with known commercial codes.

With the outbreak of war the office was reorganised, and S. was made head of Referat 9C, Referat "NORDLAENDER UND INLAND". The head of Referat 9 was Ober Reg Rat WENZEL.

3. Referat 9C This Referat appears to have been a catch-all for assorted problems that did not fit into any other section. Its commitments were:

a) SWEDEN, DENMARK, NORWAY diplomatic and consular traffic.

b) The secret messages of detained persons as requested by the police or other authority. ("KASSIBER").

c) The commercial traffic of neutral countries (especially TURKEY).

d) Ship traffic of Northern European countries (1939-40 only).

The strength of the Referat varied according to its success with problems. It averaged about 20 people, mainly routine helpers.

4. Swedish consular traffic in a 4 and 5 digit non-alphabetic code, unenciphered, was read, especially the link between STOCKHOLM and TOKYO. Almost all of the other links went over to a machine in 1939, but TOKIO was unable to convert [illegible] made and was called to "KRYTAA". S. thinks it had 15 numbered wheels. The FA never broke this and considered it 100% secure. (This sounded to interrogator like a thoroughly garbled description of either the KRYHA or HAGELIN machine. S. did not seem sensitive on the point, or to be garbling deliberately).

None of the main consular links to WASHINGTON, LONDON, or PARIS were ever read, nor was there any success with Swedish diplomatic in Referat 90.

5. Norwegian Diplomatic. An unenciphered 5-letter code was read completely up to 1940. Nothing was read after the Norwegian Government moved to LONDON, and S., had a vague impression they had gone over to a machine.

6. Danish Diplomatic. About 50% of the traffic in the old diplomatic code was read up to 1940. Nothing was solved thereafter except an occasional message in the old code, on some minor commercial subject.

7. Commercial Codes. Several enciphered versions of standard codes were solved, but S. did not consider any of the results of importance. Traffic between TURKEY and SWEDEN was attacked particularly and solved, but yielded none of the expected information on shipping possibilities.

A major effort of the section was the solution in 1944 of the code used by INTABANK, the International Bank at BASLE. The code used was an old Bank of England code which had been solved in 1941. The pages were shuffled, and an encipherment added, but solution was achieved by the use of cribs and common form messages, of which the best was a statement of the daily exchange rates between various countries.

The detail of the encipherment was as follows: the basic system was bigram substitution from a table different for each link and changing each 3 months. The text was divided into segments of three or four groups, and the plain text bigrams for encipherment were prearranged pairs, as 1 and 15, 2 and 14, 6 and 10 etc. Very long depths and near depths were produced on closely similar number values, and this was the entry. The whole solution took about 6 months, starting with 1942-3 traffic and working up to 1944. The interception of the traffic was not systematised at any time, and S. did not believe more than 50% of all the traffic was read as a result of the solution.

8. Clandestine Traffic of Detainees. This was only scattered messages in individualistic systems, which were rarely solved. SAUERBIER's concern with it led indirectly to his work on:

9. Russian Agent Traffic. SAUERBIER was approached directly in 1941 by the ORDNUNGSPOLIZEI with a request for cryptographic advice on the systems used by Russian agents. They gave him copies of

systems that were captured with agents, and he grouped these by categories. Analysis was limited almost entirely to a study of characteristics and recognition signals, with a view to advising on the possibility of a "GEGENSPIEL".

This work was done first in S's own time. WENZEL, his chief, opposed his involvement in it, but was powerless to prevent it, as the requests later came down through proper channels directed to S. It was a one-man job entirely, with only the occasional help of a girl file clerk. It generally took about one half of S's time.

S. estimated that a total of 150 different keys passed through his hands, mostly hand substitution systems, mostly in Russian but many in German (S. himself does not know Russian at all.) of these only 4 or 5 were solved without a completely captured key. One of the achievements of which SAUERBIER was proudest was the use of an ordinary book, left behind by an agent, to solve his traffic.

S. was never concerned with radio procedures, but purely with the cipher systems used. He was able to give advice on the probable group to which an agent belonged and could then consult his records for an account of the success or failure of a particular technique of "GEGENSPIEL" against this group.

10. Rest of Hauptabteilung IV. S's account of the whold crypt section is less complete than that of PAETZEL (I/54) but agrees with it on all important particulars except for the size of Referat 9. S. gives this as 45 people during the war, with a few more previously who were engaged in a fruitless attack on Russian diplomatic traffic. (This attack culminated in the belief that the system was a code with a non-repeating additive).

S. could give no details of Referats 6, 7, or 8. Of Referat 9A he recalled only the solution of a Polish diplomatic code in 1940-41. This he remembered as using one additive of specific length, which after 1943 became too long to produce depths, so that it was not solved after that time. (This sounded to interrogator more like a Polish Home Office than a Foreign Office system).

S. givea a general picture of a highly bureaucratic organisation dominated by red tape and procedure, so that no department knew what the others were doing. SCHROEDER was old and fussy, liking quiet and disliking innovation. PAETZEL was also very petty and academic in his outlook.

This narrowness affected relations of the FA with the Auswaertiges Amt, OKW, and OKH. Liaison was handled by a single representative and never involved any exchange of visits by operations personnel. S. said he did not know one single person in any of the other organizations.

Similarly there was no close relation between solution and evaluation work. The crypt sections simply did their work and handed the untranslated product over to the evaluation section without ever knowing what became it thereafter -

11. Movements of FA. Hauptabt. IV moved to BRESLAU early in 1944. Working conditions were not good and the work suffered. With the Russian advance BRESLAU was abandoned early in 1945 and all sections of the office were scattered, S. himself returning to BERLIN.

Copy to H.C. SG.
Section V
Capt Ginsburg.
11/10

15 (—) (15)

OBSTLT. METTIG OF OKW/Chi on WA PRUEF 7 AND

RLM/FORSCHUNGSAMT

Attached are two short memoranda obtained from Oberstlt. METTIG at C.S.D.I.C. (U.K.) on the activities of (a) Wa Pruef 7 and (b) the Forschungsamt.

TICOM

4th October, 1945. No. of pages : 3.

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S.A.C. for Section V
S.A.C. for Capt. Ginsburg. — not sent as Capt Ginsburg has left copy in misc P.O.W

A.

SPECIAL INTERCEPT ACTIVITIES CARRIED ON BY WA PRÜF 7

1. GENERAL ORG. WA. PRÜF 7.

PW cannot give an accurate picture of the inter-departmental organisation of Wa Prüf 7. The department itself was responsible for the technical development of signals equipment and special signals apparatus for the army; it carried out this work in conjunction with special industrial firms. Wa Prüf 7 worked in conjunction with similar departments of the Navy, Air Force and SS. The technical side of signals production and of the allocation of raw materials etc was centrally directed by OKW/Ag WNV/GBN (Obst GRÜBE and Stubaf SOBE). Wa Prüf 7, as far as PW remembers, consisted of the following sections:-

7/I	Policy and organisation
7/II	Line communications
7/III	Secret teleprinters and cipher machines.
7/IV	WT
7/V	Speech encipherment.

2. EXPERIMENTAL STATION AT STAATS

For carrying out special experiments in signals equipment, Wa Prüf 7 disposed of its own station at STAATS. The main activity carried out here was in the development of intercept equipment. The department was already active before the war.

3. The principal activities carried out at STAATS were directed by Baurat Dipl Ing KERKHOF, who specialised in WT reception and DF-ing; Baurat Dipl Ing Dr LOTZE, who specialised in speech encipherment; Baurat Dipl Ing Dr LIEBKNECHT, who specialised in secret teleprinters, WT teleprinting and cipher machines; Baurat Dipl Ing Dr SCHELLHOS, who specialised in Multiplex and Baudot. The work carried out by KERKHOF, LOTZE and LIEBKNECHT, in so far as PW is in the picture, has already been described in TICOM/I-78 and in a forthcoming report on OKW/Chi. The following information on the activities of Dr SCHELLHOS with which Dr LOTZE was also concerned in the early stages may, however, be of interest.

4. Experiments were already in progress in 1937, with the object of intercepting Baudot and Multiplex traffic. The experiments concentrated on intercepting Russian multi-channel WT teleprinter traffic (of 3 or 15 channels). The traffic intercepted was transmitted in clear and only enciphered technically, i.e. by scrambling various channels together. With the separation of the channels the traffic was picked up in clear.

5. In 1938 Wa Prüf 7 organised a lecture for heads of army intercept coys in which developments in this special field were discussed. The equipment shown was very delicate and had not yet reached its final stage of development. However, progress was so advanced that the army intercept coys were ordered to watch all special traffic they picked up, to record it on magnetophones and to forward the results to Wa Prüf 7 for analysis. In order to assist the army intercept coys in recognising special transmissions, acoustic tone films were issued. From that time onwards Wa Prüf 7 became very secretive and although it received traffic from the army intercept coys, it never reported what progress had been achieved. PW knows, however, that considerable successes were achieved during the war, especially against RUSSIA, and that before the war the Baudot link PARIS/MOSCOW had been satisfactorily intercepted. PW has the impression that the work at STAATS was highly successful because in 1941, despite the manpower shortage, the establishment was increased.

6. PERSONALITIES

Genlt. GIMMLER	Head of Wa Prüf 7 at the outbread of war.
Obst.Dipl.Ing. KARN	Successor to Genlt. GIMMLER, captured in TUNIS.
Obst. HENIGST	Successor to Obst KARN and in charge of the department until the end of the war.
Obstlt. PÄCHTER	In charge of Wa Prüf 7/IV, which controlled the wireless department.

B.

F O R S C H U N G S A M T

1. GENERAL

The Forschungsamt was a part of the Reichsluftfahrtministerium and was directly subordinated to Staatssekretär KÖRNER and, through him, to Reichsmarschall GÖRING. The head of this department was Ministerialdirigent TSCHAPPER who, prior to the establishment of the Forschungsamt, had worked in OKW Chi and served under Ministerialrat FENNER. Another former official of OKW in the Forschungsamt was Regierungsrat SEIFERT.

2. Collaboration between the Forschungsamt and OKW Chi was poor. This may well have been due to the personal differences between Ministerialrat FENNER and his former subordinate TSCHAPPER. PW is not in a position to state who represented the Forschungsamt in the special cipher committee of Regierungsrat Dr HÜTTENHAIN. The attempt of the Forschungsamt to take over all the broadcasts and news agency monitory work carried on by OKW Chi illustrates the relations between the two departments. PW is not in the picture on the relations of the Forschungsamt and other departments save that he is aware that there was no collaboration at any time between Gen d. Nachr. Aufkl. and the Forschungsamt. Likewise it is not known whether the Forschungsamt produced special ciphers for the use of government departments over and above those produced by OKW Chi.

3. PERSONALITIES

Ministerialdirigent TSCHAPPER	- Amtschef Forschungsamt
Oberregierungsrat HUTTENBERG	- Technical adviser for cable and wireless matters.
" ODEN	- Technical adviser for cables
" SEIFERT.	

copy to H.C.S.G.
Section V.
25/9

(14)

TOP SECRET -1- TICOM/I-108

INTERROGATION OF G O E R I N G ON

THE RLM/FORSCHUNGSAMT

Attached is an extract from an interrogation report CCPWE No. 32/DI-7 dated 15th June 1945, issued by A.C. of S., G-2, SHAEF.

The remainder of the original report deals only with general political matters.

TICOM
18 Sept. 1945

No. of pages 3

DISTRIBUTION

British

D.D.3
H.C.G.
D.D. (N.S.)
D.D. (M.W.)
D.D. (A.S.)
C.C.R. (2)
Lt. Col. Leathem
Cdr. Tandy
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A.S.A. (3) (via Major Seaman)
Director, S.I.D. USFET
(via Lt. Col. Johnson)
Col. Lewis Powell, USSTAF

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S.A.C. for Section V.

CCPWE No. 32/DI-7

15 Jun 45

SPECIAL DETENTION CENTRE "ASCHCAN"

CCPWE No. 32, APO 513

FORSCHUNGSAMT DES REICHSLUFTFAHRT MINISTERIUMS

(GERMAN AIR MINISTRY SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH OFFICE)

I. SOURCE

Name: GOERING, Hermann
Rank: REICHSMARSCHALL
Interned: 7 May 1945
Interrogated: 10 June 1945

II. PREAMBLE

PW GOERING cannot be considered a strictly truthful character when discussing personal relations, possessions, etc. and when an investigation of his income and fortune is made. At the same time he has been considerably shaken in his bloated belief in his own grandeur. He talks readily and, it is believed, reliably on questions about the Nazi state, personalities, the Air Corps, conduct of the war, etc. He is a drug addict. He has no mind for details and apparently considered such beneath his dignity.

Estimate of Reliability: Probably true report.

III. G.A.M. SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH OFFICE

A. The Actual Functions of this Office - Monitoring

This name is merely camouflage as this office was not concerned with the Air Ministry in any way. It was conceived and founded by GOERING in 1933 for the purpose of a central control over the collection and dissemination of vital information of military, commercial, and political nature. This information was obtained by the monitoring of all communications systems such as domestic and foreign radio, cables, etc.

Previous to 1933 the foreign office had established a similar monitoring system, for intercepting wireless messages, and the police had monitored telephone conversations etc. but GOERING wanted an organisation of his own which could handle all phases under one central control. By various means he was able to obtain the services of some of the most able men in GERMANY for the construction and administration of this project. GOERING was the responsible authority, issued all directives and dictated the policy. Under Secretary Paul KOERNER was second in command while the actual managing director was Ministerial Director SCHAPPER (first name unknown).

As stated before the office monitored all types of communications and had particular success in breaking our codes through which they obtained invaluable information. According to source our Ministry in SWITZERLAND proved especially fruitful in this phase of the work but he gives us specific instances of information attained.

The monitoring of telephone conversations was accomplished by the co-operation of the Reichspost as was the reception of teletype and telegram message.

B. The Berlin Office - A Dissemination Centre

The main office was situated in Berlin and there were various subordinate offices whose location source does not know. Employees were civilians, at least in the responsible positions but the actual number of employees, distribution etc. were minor details with which source did not concern himself.

The information was collected, decoded, evaluated, classified and disseminated. All ministries were recipients of the finished product, receiving however, only that material which concerned their own particular province. After the beginning of the war the actual front line communications were handled by the fighting forces' own monitoring systems.

There were other organisations of this type in existence such as the ones controlled by the SS which were concerned chiefly with the monitoring of domestic lines but GOERING's group was the most successful due to the outstanding ability of his experts and technicians.

RLM/Forschungsamt - Organisation

A captured telephone directory taken from the RLM/Forschungsamt has produced the list of officials shown on the attached list, with information as to their status and functions. A diagram showing telephone communications is included. The directory was undated.

TICOM

Date: 14th Sept. 1945. No. of Pages: 3

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Additional

S.A.C. for D.D.(C.S.I.)
" " Section V.

Names taken From Telephone List
of the Forschungsamt/RLM (undated)

Forschungsamt Subscribers.

Min. Dir. SCHAPPER. Director of F.A. (RLM/FA/L).

Ob. Reg. Rat. STABENOW. Chief Dept. Director VI. (RLM/FA/VI).

Ob. Reg. Rat. ROSENHAHN. Director Dept. 1. (RLM/FA/1).

BECKER. (RLM/FA/V/3).

(Ob. Reg. Rat. BÖTTGER) (RLM/FA.

Dr. GERSTMEYER. Head of Liaison Office to A.A. (RLM/FA/V ST. A.A.).

Dr. HUPPERTSBERG. Ob. Reg. Rat. Head Dept. 14. (RLM/FA/14).

Dr. HILLIGARDT. Reg. Rat. Head of Liaison Office to R.W.i.M. (RLM/FA/V.ST.R.Wi.M).

KELL. Research Office A1/2 BERLIN .Exploitation Centre. (RLM/FA/AW - Kopf.)

Dr. KLAUTSCHKE. Head of OKW Liaison Office. (RLM/FA/V.ST. OKW).

Reg. Rat. ODEN. Head Dept. 15. (RLM/FA/15).

SEVERITT. Head of Liaison Office to R.M.V.P. (= Reichsministerium fuer Volksaufklaerung u. Propaganda). (RLM/FA/V.ST. RMVP).

SCHOLZ. Reg. Rat. Head of RSHA Liaison Office. (RLM/FA/V.ST. RSHA).

THIEME Reg. Rat. Head of Central Office BERLIN. (RLM/FA/FL - BLN.)

STATE MINISTRY

KÖRNER. Secretary of State. (Preuss. State-Min.)

DRAPE. Min. Rat. (Preuss State Min. and 4 year plan).

LEGLER. Min. Rat. (Preuss State Min. and 4 year plan).

/RLM

RLM

BOKELBERG Col. Group Leader of the "Supervision" (Monitoring) Dept. (RLM/Z.A. UWa).

BODENSCHATZ General der Flieger. Head of the Office of Ministers. (RLM/Ministeramt).

v. DÖRING. Lt. Gen. Group Head of Equipment Dept. (RLM/Z.A.).

MILCH. Field Marshal. Sec. of State for Air and Inspector General of the G.A.F. (RLM).

SIMSON. Col, Commandant RLM. (RLM/Z.A.).

RSHA

MÜLLER Lt. Gen. of Police SS. Gruppenfuehrer. Head of Sect.IV. (RSHA/IV).

SCHELLENBERG. Maj. Gen. of Police SS. Brigadenfuehrer. Head of Section VI. (RSHA/VI).

BOCK Ob. Reg. Rat. SS Obersturmbannfuehrer. Head of State Police Central Office, BERLIN. (STAPOLEIT/L).

EBELING. Krim. Komm. SS. Obersturmfuehrer. State Police Central Office Section IV N. (STAPOLEIT/IV N).

DRP (Deutsche Reichspost)

HOFMANN Postrat. Head of Work connected with service matters. (RPZ/We - E).

WICHMANN Min.Rat. Head of Office of Ministers and Dept.VII. (RPM).

TRANS: WJO


Marchstr.
Vermittlung
Archivstr.
Haldl. Leitg. Templ.
Fernplatz
Allgem. Anlage
Post
308627
Glinkastr.
TG 3500
od. 762251
Dr. Huppertsbg.
2234
Fmeld.-T.
310015 od. 937640
Herbartstr.
Labo.
Templ.
Konstz.
Waldlg.
Fernplatz
2203
3573
Stabs Anlage
(935544)
St.Min. Lpzgstr.
Teilnehmer gem. Sond.-Verz.
4224
81849
OKW
RLM
Ausk.
09
91
92
8771 Ausw. Amt
81893
8801 Fernamt Bln.
GH
970
970-0
3337
3338
8822 Funküberwch. RPZ.
8871 R.S.H.A.
891
Fernamt Heer
00
8811 Heeres Verw. A.
8828 R. Min. V. u. P.
81877
RPD Berlin
82865
8725
6101
8841 R.P.M.
81889
8802 R.P.Z.
107
81 x)
8783 SS-Führungs-Hauptamt
8880 HTA
(Stentl: 27481)
(270066)
(27286)
95
8095 General Kmdo III. AK.
8863 Preuss. Staats-Min.
81871
11 33 Stellen
78
88-0
83
83-0
82
82-0
Fernamt Luft-Wasse
71
Ortsverm.
GL
Karlshall
81870
SZ
2594
2596
Flugpl. Tphst.
Verbindung kann bis zum Endteilnehmer durchgewählt werden.
Vermittlungsstelle anwählbar, Teilnehmer dort anfordern.
x) z. Zt. noch nicht betriebsfähig.
Reichsluftfahrtmin. Forschungsamt.
Querverbindungen

copy to D.D.(ESA).
" " Section V
9/8

15(T)

SECOND INTERROGATION OF FIVE MEMBERS OF THE RLM/ FORSCHUNGSAMT

The attached is a report of the interrogation at DUSTBIN KRAMSBERG near FRANKFURT of the five members of the FA of whose previous interrogation at FLENSBURG the report was published as TICOM I/25.

TICOM
2 Aug. 1945

No. of pages 4

Distribution

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Lt. Col.Leathem

U.S.
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G-2(via Lt. Col. Hilles)
S.S.A.(2)(via Major Seaman)
Director, S.I.D. USFET(via Lt. Col. Johnson)

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Cdr. Bacon
Cdr. MacKenzie
Cdr. Tandy
Lt. Col. Johnson
Lt. Cdr. Manson
Major Seaman
Lt. Eachus
Lt. Vance
Capt. Cowan
Lt. Feld
Ticom Files(2)

Additional
S.A.C.(one extra for Section V)

RLM/FORSCHUNGSAMT

Interrogation of the following five members of RLM/FA on Saturday, 28 July 1945 at DUSTRIN by Capt. Campbell and Capt. Lively.

ODEN, Hoeckly, Reg. Rat Dipl. Ing.

PAETZEL, Martin, ORR, Dr.

SEIFERT, Walter, Min. Rat

FINGERHUT, Otto, Reg. Rat

KLAUTSCHKE, Heinz, Dr.

A. Oden

According to O. RLM/FA consisted of the following six Hauptabteilungen:

I. Organisation und Verwaltung: Leiter-Min Rat. Berggren
II. Personal: Leiter-Reg. Rat Kempe
III. Einsatz und Erfassung: Leiter Min. Rat Breuer
IV. Entzifferung: Leiter-Min. Rat Dir. Schroeder
V. Auswertung: Leiter-Min. Rat Seifert
VI. Technik- Leiter-ORR Stabenow

These Hauptabteilungen were subdivided into Abteilungen of which there were altogether about 15. Hauptabteilung VI, O's own department, had two subsections, a. Pruefung und Entwickling and b. Betrieb. He was the head of this latter subsection. He was thus responsible generally for the maintenance of all RLM/FA's communications but was not concerned at all with devising of developing new apparatus which was the task of Abteilung a. When questioned about his connection with OKW on cipher security matters, he said that this was purely ad hoc. He was present only at discussions on the security of T52 and attended more by virtue of his previous employment with Siemens und Halske than by his present position with RLM/FA. They had no liaison with Wa Pruef VII except in connection with such apparatus as was supplied to them by this body.

B. PAETZEL

P. was deputy director of Hauptabteilung IV, Entzifferung, which comprised the following four Abteilungen:

Abt. 7-Uebersee. USA, England, Ireland, South America, Spain, Portugal, Turkey, Egypt, Far East. Personnel roughly 60-70.

Abt. 8-West und Suedwest. France, Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, Italy Rumania. Personnel 30-40.

Abt. 9-Slavonic and Scandinavian. All Slavonic and Scandinavian countries plus Hungary, Greece, Finland. Personnel 60-70.

Abt. 6-P. was head on this Abteilung which came into existence only in 1941 and had fewer members than the others. In fact, about 30. Whereas the other Abteilungen dealt with material which he described as "aktuell", Abt. 6 worked on problems which could not be dealt with by the others currently and was also in the nature of a research section to work on new systems. They dealt in the main with diplomatic traffic of America, England, Japan, Free France, Spain and Spanish America. Their main machine success was with the Swiss Enigma as long as the same machine setting was used over a longish period. He also said that they had been able to break the Finnish Hagelin on a single message if they had 4000 letters or more of text. He knew no details of the method as he had not worked on it himself. That had been done by Reg. Rat KROEGER. They could also break it of course on a compromise. When asked if they had solved any other machine systems, he replied that they had broken a Japanese

system in '41 -'42 which was thought to be a machine system though their solution was not mechanical but employed simply paper strips. They had worked also on an American strip system where 30 out of a matrix of 50 strips were employed in a setting. This traffic was America- Europe but whether Washington - London or Washington- Paris was not known.

Abt. 7 had worked on Irish reciphered codes with considerable success("ziemlich laufend") up to the end on the war.

Abt. 8 had been able to read unreciphered French codes and was for the most part successful with Italian codes.

Polish agent codes were worked on by Abt. 9. A large variety of systems was employed and it was difficult to assess the organisation owing to the widespread use of cover names.

He mentioned also a Japanese main diplomatic system which employed a codebook reciphered by a combination of transposition and Raster. They were successful with this until the last phase of the war.(in letzer Zeit).

[redacted]

They had had a certain amount of liaison with OKH on the security of T52.

C. Seifert

S. was head of Hauptabteilung V.He confirmed the outline of the organisation already obtained and gave the following account of the founding and purpose of the RHSA.

The bureau was founded in 1933 at the instigation of a certain Kap.(?) SCHEPF in order to provide diplomatic and commercial intelligence of an absolutely reliable kind by the monitoring of telephone, cable and wireless links from the Reich outward and in the case of wireless from all countries, and to insure by the setting up of a new and independent organisation the elimination of all bias which might have resulted from association with the old established ministries. The object of the department was the production of a purely objective and scientific picture of the worldwide political and commercial situation.

[redacted]

The new material provided by its sources was forwarded after processing to the ministries concerned under three different categories viz.:

1) The individual items of current interest ("aktuelle Meldungen").
2) Collected items on a given single subject ("zusammengefasste Meldungen")
3) Consolidated reports ("Synthesen")--e.g. Japanese-Russian relations.

He had no detailed knowledge of the crytanalytic success achieved.

D. FINGERHUT

F. was with the Hauptabteilung V from 1937 till 1942. There were four Abteilungen numbered 10-13 and F. was with Abteilung 11 whose concern was Aussenpolitik. The other subdivisions were 12)Wirtschaftspolitik, 13) Innenpolitik and 10) Archiv, Bücherei, Registraturwesen. Within Abt. 11 he was specifically concerned first with Scandinavian: in civil life he had been a Wissenschaftlicher Assistent at the University of Greifswald, philologist in Scandinavian languages. Later he specialized in Italy and finally in Russia and the Far East. In 1942 he took over the running of a newly founded school for [illegible]. He stressed however that this school did not train new personnel since they had no intake but indeed lost people to the armed forces, but existed mainly to provide refresher courses for Auswerter at the headquarters and for the people working in the Aussenstellen who by the nature of their work required a high degree of expert knowledge in the subject they covered. There were 15 to 18 of these Auswerter [illegible] private Enterprise

stations of the Forschungsamt.

Questioned on the scope of their activity on Innenpolitik, he replied that they covered communications of firms and individuals to persons abroad, suspected subversive propaganda, relations of army officers with persons outside the Reich, etc.

E.KLAUTSCHKE

K. was the liaison officer (Verbindungsmann) to OKW and also OKL, OKL and OKH. Although a member of FA, he had his office in OKW. It was his job to receive material from FA and pass it on to the section concerned at OKW etc. At OKW he supplied Keitel and various departments, for example WFST/Amt Gr. Ausl, Feldwirtschaftsamt, Attache Abteilung, Abwehr and M.A. At OKL besides Doenits and his chief of staff von Davidson he supplied 3. SKL and Marineruestungsamt. At OKL - Lloh, LK Fuehrungsstab I C, Chef Technische L. Ruest (Genmaj. Diessing).At OKH General Staff, Fremde Heere West and Fremde Heere Ost.

There were similar liaison officers with the other ministries such as Dr. HILLIGARDT at Ruestungsministerium and Reichswirtschaftsministerium and Dr. GERSTMEYER with the Auswaertiges Amt.

His liaison duties were concerned solely with the passing of intelligence from FA to OKW etc. and of particular intelligence requests in the other direction. As far as he knew there was no liaison on cryptanalytic matters between the two. Certain raw material however which was not worked on at FA was passed regularly to OKW, for example military traffic. When asked if his connection with the OKW/ATT.Abt. meant that the FA handled attache ciphers he said no, that only the telephone conversations of their Allies ' attaches in Berlin were concerned. These were mostly about their girl friends, and never contained any hing of importance because the attaches knew they were monitored.

F. Conclusion

None of the five knew anything about a cryptanalytic section of the affen SS. Seifert thought there couldn't have been such a thing as he had seen intercepted cipher telegrams sent to them from RSHA which RSHA had no facilities for deciphering. Paetzel, on the other hand, remarked somewhat drily that from what he knew of the stubborn independence in this matter of the various services and the Foreign Office he would not at all be surprised if such a thing in fact did exist. However he had no knowledge of it.

The party as a whole were much more forthcoming and cooperative than the interrogators had been led to expect would be the case from the previous report.

Employees of
REICHSLUFTFAHRT MINISTERIUM /
FORSCHUNGSAMT
Kaufbeuren.

Min. Dir. Schaper * * X
Min. Rat Berggren * X
O.R.R. Rosenhahn. *
ORR Hansemüller *
ORR Kempe *
Min. Rat Breuer * X
R.R. Popp * X
R.R. Dr. Henke * X
Min. Dirig. Schroeder * *
ORR Dr. Paetzl * * X
ORR Waechter * * X
ORR Schmelz * * (Chauffeur to be dead)
ORR Wenzel * * X
Min. Rat Seigel * * X

RR Dr Mews * ✓

ORR Dr Kurzbach x

RR Dr Runtenkranz x

RR Reinschke x

ORR Dip. Ing. Stabenow ***✓

ORR Dr. Huppertsberg xxx ✓

~~Min. Rat~~

Reg. Dr. Gerth x ✓

~~RR Hencke~~ ✓

mdWdGb RR Trübenbach ✓

RR Oden

RR Niedermeyer xx (last- Hauptst- in Hannich)

Reg. Dr. Gerstmeyer * ✓

Reg. Dr. Klautschke ** ✓

RR Thieme ** ✓

ORR Kirbach xx (last- head of in Hamburg)

~~Reg. Dr Gerstmeyer~~

RR Dipl. Ing. Schulz * ✓

RR Dr Fingerhut

Dr. Czigar * ✓

RR Kröger ** ✓

Frl. Graudus ✓

Herr Markinghaus * ✓

Dr Thonak * ✓

RR von Stumpnacht ✓

Herr and Frau Schwirulla ✓

Dr Weidinger ** (parents, K. & A
weidinger, addrs: München 13
Friedrichstrasse
36/III)

RR Engelke * ✓

RR Dr HAUMER * ✓

Dr Ahrens ✓

Dr Schmidt ✓

Dr Kockjoy ✓

Dr Wolff ✓

RR Michaelis ✓

(?) Dr Groth ** ✓

Herr Schumpelden ✓

Dip. Ing. Bäumer ** ✓

Reg. O. Insp. Grunert * ✓

(Dr ?) Fuhrmann ✓

(4)

Leonhardt* ✓ (an engineer, probably)

Dip. Ing. Stra* ✓

Dr. Baumeister* ✓

Fritz Barth (near relatives, Erica
and Dieter Barth live at
(10) Mittweida, Zeisig 10) ✓

EMPLOYEES OF

REICHSLUFTFAHRT MINISTERIUM/FORSCHUNGSAMT

KAUFBEUREN.

Min. Dir.	Schapper **
Min. Rat	Berggren *
O.R.R.	Rosenhahn
O.R.R.	Kempe
O.R.R.	Kunsemuller
Min. Rat	Brener *
R.R.	Popp *
R.R.	Dr. Honke *
Min. Dirig.	Schroeder **
O.R.R.	Dr. Paetzl ***
O.R.R.	Waechter **
O.R.R.	Schulz ** (thought to be dead).
O.R.R.	Wenzel **
Min. Rat	Seifert **
R.R.	Dr. Mews *
O.R.R.	Dr. Kurzbach
R.R.	Dr. Rautenkrans
R.R.	Rentschler
O.R.R. Dip. Ing	Stobenow ***
O.R.R.	Dr. Huppertsberg ***
Ang.	Dr. Gerth *
[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible] R.R.	Trübenbach
R.R.	Oden.
R.R.	Niedermayer ** (last thought to be in Munich).
Ang.	Dr. Gerstmeyer *
Ang.	Dr. Klemtzken **
R.R.	Thiem **
O.R.R.	Kärbach ** (last heard of in Holland).
Ang.	Dr.
R.R. Dipl. Ing.	Schulz *
R.R.	Dr. Finsterwald.

Dr. Czigar *

R.R. Krüger **

Frl. Grunau

Herr Merklingaus **

Dr. Thomik *

R.R. von Stülpnagel

Herr & Frau Schwitalla

Dr. Weidinger ** (Parents, K. & A. Weidinger;
Address, München 13 Friedrichstrasse 56(I)
3rd Floor)

R.R. Engelke *

R.R. Dr. Hammer **

Dr. Arens

Dr. Schmidt

Dr. Kockjoy

Dr. Wolff

R.R. Michaelis

Dr. (?) Groth **

Herr Schoenfelder

Dip. Ing. Blüm **

Reg. O. Insp. Grunert *

Dr. (?) Fabisch

Leuchtgut * (probably an engineer).

Dip. Ing. Strob *

Dr. Baumeister *

Fritz Barth (near relatives:-
Erica & Dieter Barth, live at (1c) Mittweida,
Zeisig 10).

-ofo-

V JEA R NR 1 OP 071550B GR 175

FOR BEARCE FROM BICHER FROM NEFF PLS PASS TO OESER OUR F 78

TOP SEC

THOUGHT TO HAVE GONE TO KAUFBEUREN IS CHI DEPT OF LUFTFAHRT MINISTERIUM. THIS FORMERLY SCHILLERSTRASSE BERLIN THEN MOVED TO BRESLAU HARTLIEB BARRACKS; JUETERBOG; FINALLY KAUFBEUREN. MYN RAT SCHROEDER RPT SCHROEDER IS HEAD; FOUR DEPARTMENT HEADS ARE OBERREGRAT WAECHTER RPT WAECHTER COVERING PORTUGAL SPAIN EIRE CHINA JAPAN TURKEY (UL) ENGLAND, WITH AUSTER RPT SAXEX RPT AUSTER, THONAK RPT THONAK ND KISCHNER RPT KIRSCHNER WORKING FOR HIM; ORR SCHULTX RPT SCHULTX DEPUTY HAUMEG RPT HAUMER COVERING GREN ITAL RLUMAN VAPLS, MWITT REGRAT EOGELKET RPT ENGELKE WORKING IN DEPT; ORR WENXEL RPT WENXEL ALL GREEK ND SLAV WITH TONDORF RPT TONDORF ND LEHR HELPING; DR PAETXEL RPT PAETXEL COVERS ALL SORTS MAT PROBLEMS

FROM : SID
TO : 129
TOO : 071550B
TIME RECD: 071[illegible]B
TIME DECD: 071[illegible]5B
PREC : OP

15(T)

For Elizabeth Friedlander's (Civil Division) views on ELSUR/FA, see Item 10 of Tab/I-29 memo re 15(G).

15(T) 6.

TOP SECRET

m/135

7th July, 1945

Dear Wilson,

Herewith your copy of TICOM/I-25, interrogation of the RSA/Foreignpost prisoners at Flensburg.

C.3. We have put [redacted] on the wanted list (TICOM "Brown List")

C. 18 to 21. [redacted]-Polish Diplomatic traffic said to have been impregnable, after them unreciphered books. [redacted] also on the Brown List.

C. 23. Work on Interdepartmental Cypher.

C. 40. [redacted] repeats HUETTENHAIN's estimate of minimum message length for breaking Hagelin on single message.

C. 70. No Chinese traffic said to have been read.

I'm afraid that a good deal of the replies must be accepted very provisionally. These prisoners were fairly consistently evasive - perhaps largely because of their special duties for the [redacted]; I rather imagine that their Min. Director SCHAFFER, gave them all a very stiff pep talk just before the end, instructing them to give away as little as possible.

Them asked about the RSA/FA on Wednesday, Friedrich of the C.A.F. stated that they carried out monitoring, "not only against the enemy, but equally against German agencies for political purposes, such as the telephone and telegraph communications of German industrial and the Reichspost."

Yours sincerely,

Captain G.A.Wilson, R.N.,
Chesterfield Street.

(Copy to DD S.)

16 (T)

TICOM/I-25

TOP SECRET

INTERROGATION OF FIVE MEMBERS OF THE RLM/FORSCHUNGSAMT ("GOERING'S FA")

AT SCHLOSS GLUECKSBURG, NEAR FLENSBURG ON 15th AND 21st JUNE 1945

The following four civilians were transferred from the RLM/FA to OKM, 4 SKL III on 16th May 1945, where they worked until arrested on 23rd May 1945:-

(a) Dr. Martin PAETZEL: said to be in charge of a section devoted to breaking of codes, since 1933.

(b) Regierungsrat Otto FINGERHUT: said to be in charge of the evaluation of information, since 1937. Before then studied Scandinavian languages at Greifswald University.

(c) Regierungsrat Hoeckley ODEN: said to be in charge of the technical apparatus, since 1936. Before then with Siemens and Halske.

(d) Dr. Heinz KLAUTSCHE: said to be in charge of dissemination of information to the various interested agencies, since 1936. Before then studied business at various universities.

In addition, the following official of the RLM/FA was interrogated:

Min.Rat SEIFERT: In charge of the Intelligence Section of the Forschungsamt.

Attached are reports of their first and second interrogations. All five are being held for further investigation. It has been reported that the F.A. were also responsible for the Nazi Party monitoring Service.

TICOM
5 July 1945

No. of Pages 9

Distribution:

British
Director
D.D.3.
D.D.4.
D.D.(N.S.)
D.D.(M.W.)
D.D.(A.S.)
A.D.(C.C.R.) (2)
Lt.Col. Leathen

U.S.
OP-20-G (2) (via Lt. Pendergrass)
G-2 (via Lt.Col. Hilles)
S.S.A. (2) (via Major Seaman)
Director, S.I.D. ETOUSA (2) (via Lt.Col. Johnson)

TICOM
Chairman
S.A.C. (2)
Cdr. Bacon
Cdr. Mackenzie
Cdr. Tandy
Lt.Col. Johnson
Lt.Cdr. Manson
Major Seaman
Lieut. Eachus
Lieut. Vance
Captain Cowan
Lieut. Fehl
TICOM Files (2)

Additional
S.A.C. (2 extra for Lt.Cdr. Davenport and Section V)
Major Morgan
Dr. Pickering

TOP SECRET

FIRST INTERROGATION - SCHLOSS GLUECKSBURG - 1715/15th JUNE 1945

Subjects: Min.Rat. SEIFERT
Reg.Rat. ODEN
Dr. PAETZEL
Reg.Rat. FINGERHUT
Dr. KLAUTSCHE
} RLM/Forschungsamt

Present: Cdr. Dudley-Smith, R.N.
Major Morgan, I.C.
Major Seaman, U.S. Army
Lt.Cdr. Davenport, R.N.V.R.
Lt.Cdr. Forster, R.N.V.R.
Captain Royffe, I.C.
Lieut. Kirby, U.S. Army
Lieut. Morley, R.N.V.R.

Q.1 What were the general functions of the Forschungsamt?

SEIFERT: Our duties were general interception of traffic, decyphering, and the provision of intelligence obtained from this material. We intercepted both W/T and Cable traffic. I was Head of a Section of the Forschungsamt and when the main body of the organisation went South I came North to organise the interception of Broadcast and Press Traffic.

Q.2 What were your original duties?

SEIFERT: I was responsible for the editing of the intercepted material into the form of reports.

Q.3 Describe the organisation of the Forschungsamt.

SEIFERT: It consisted of six Sections:-

1. Organisation
2. Personnel
3. Technical and interception
4. Decypherment
5. Intelligence
6. Technical matters (equipment)

The Director of the Organisation was Min. Direktor Schapper.

The Heads of the six Sections were as follows:-

1. Min.Rat. Bergeren
2. O.R.R. Kempe
3. Min.Rat. Breuer
4. Min.Dirigent. Schroeder
5. Min.Rat. Seifert
6. O.R.R. Stabenow

Q.4 What types of Cypher were worked on?

SEIFERT: The traffic of any country for which we had material. We preferred cable to W/T traffic because the groups were less corrupt. We were concerned with diplomatic traffic only, but the traffic of military attachés was not dealt with. We handled unrecyphered commercial traffic but no work was done on the cyphers of industrial concerns, banks, etc. We worked on economic traffic passing between various points in Russia. The only agents' traffic handled was Polish and most of the Polish agents concerned were in Czechoslovakia.

Q.5 To whom did you supply the intelligence so obtained?

SEIFERT: It was given to all Government Departments including the Foreign Office, OKW (for all services), the Food, Transport, and Propaganda Ministries and R.S.H.A. At some of these departments we had liaison officers.

Q.6 What steps were taken to prevent duplication with other organisations doing diplomatic work?

SEIFERT: In the 10 years since 1933, no one has succeeded in preventing duplication.

Q.7 On what traffic did you obtain your greatest successes?

SEIFERT: Our greatest success was obtained on internal Russian traffic which enabled us to discover the various bottlenecks in the Russian supply organisation.

Q.8 Name other countries on whose traffic you had major success.

SEIFERT: All French unrecyphered books.

Q.9 Was this particularly productive?

SEIFERT: Yes. Because the French used a large number of these books.

Q.10 Any other countries?

SEIFERT: Belgium. They used one book both with and without substitution recypherment. It was read in both cases.

Q.11 What was the strength of your organisation?

SEIFERT: 2500 including the personnel at intercept stations.

Q.12 What was the strength at Headquarters?

SEIFERT: About 1000.

Q.13 What was the strength Section by Section?

SEIFERT:

Section 1 - 150
Section 2 - 80 or 100
Section 3 - 200
Section 4 - 180
Section 5 - 400
Section 6 - 200

[Interrogator's Note: This gives a total of 1230 which is somewhat in excess of his original estimate of 1000]

Q.14 When was the Forschungsamt founded?

SEIFERT: In 1933.

Q.15 Who initiated it?

SEIFERT: It was started by Korvetten Kapitaen Schimpf who committed suicide.

Q.16 Who was the driving force behind your organisation?

SEIFERT: It was started under the Air Ministry with the intention of its being an inter-service organisation.

Q.17 Where did Goering come in?

SEIFERT: The Fuehrer directed Goering to run this organisation. I do not know more as I only joined at the end of 1933.

PAETZEL: I joined at the end of July 1933. The organisation had then been running for two or three months.

Q.18 What work was done on British diplomatic cypher systems?

PAETZEL: Work on these systems was useless and no success was obtained. There was an occasional physical compromise. We captured a clear text and a basic book in Norway but had no success with them cryptographically.

Q.19 What about low-grade systems?

PAETZEL: Traffic in unrecyphered books was attacked and read.

Q.20 Can you give any details of the clear text to which you have referred?

PAETZEL: I cannot remember whether this was ever available, but I remember the basic book.

Q.21 What was the name of the Head of the Section dealing with English traffic?

SEIFERT: O.R.R. Waechter.

Q.22 What work was done on American systems?

PAETZEL: We read U.S. plain systems and afterwards a U.S. system consisting of a five letter book recyphered by Mono-alphabetic and bigram substitution though this was not solved currently. The tables changed within the message and this change was shown by an indicator.

Q.23 How long did you take to read messages after a change of elements?

PAETZEL: We only read back material.

Q.24 How old?

PAETZEL: Several months, sometimes over a year. The successor to this system was not broken because there was no indicator in the middle of the message to show where the tables changed.

Q.25 What other American systems do you know about?

PAETZEL: We attempted a strip system and read it here and there but not currently. We finally gave it up as it took up too many personnel.

Q.26 Do you remember any originators of messages in this Strip system?

PAETZEL: No.

Q.27 Did you read any other American diplomatic traffic?

PAETZEL: No, except that sent in plain book systems.

Q.28 Did you work on Inter-Departmental Cypher?

PAETZEL: I think so but Waechter is the man to ask.

Q.29 Did Waechter also deal with American traffic?

PAETZEL: Yes he did.

Q.30 Was any intelligence of value obtained from British or American unrecyphered codes?

PAETZEL: I cannot remember anything of importance or any instance of an important message being sent in a low-grade system.

Q.31 (to ODEN) When did you join the Forschungsamt and what were your duties?

ODEN: I joined in 1936. Previously I had been an Electrical Engineer and I was responsible for the equipment of Intercept Stations, their maintenance and for certain personnel matters.

Q.32 Do you have Hollerith Machinery?

ODEN Yes.

Q.33 How many machines?

PAETZEL:
1 Alphabetic Tabulator
2 D.11 calculating tabulators
3 or 4 Sorters
1 Reproducer
Many punchers

Q.34 Had you a Karten Mischer "Collator"?

PAETZEL: No.

Q.35 Had you any Machinery other than Hollerith?

PAETZEL: No.

Q.36 (to ODEN) Did you invent any Machinery for similar purposes?

ODEN No.

Q.37 (to FINGERHUT) When did you join the Forschungsamt and what were your duties?

FINGERHUT: I joined in 1937 and worked in many capacities in the intelligence section, finally taking over a sub-section of which I was head until July 1943. I was then in charge of a training school for Evaluators until the end of 1944. Three kinds of intelligence reports were prepared. Our aim was to provide objective and scientific reports without political colouring.

Q.38 (to KLAUTSCHE) When did you join the Forschungsamt and describe your duties.

KLAUTSCHE: I joined in November 1936 and having had a university training in Economics and Politics I concentrated on the economic side, Foreign Armaments, Industries, etc. In 1943 I became Liaison Officer at OKW and was entrusted with the selection and distribution of intelligence to OKM, OKH and OKL.

[Interrogator's Note: All five detainees appeared to be reluctant to produce information which might be expected to be of long-term value to the Allies. It was particularly noted that whilst ODEN was speaking the other four were uneasy]

SECOND INTERROGATION - SCHLOSS GLUECKSBURG - p.m./21st JUNE 1945

Subjects: Dr. PAETZEL
Reg.Rat. ODEN

Present: Major Seaman, U.S. Army
Lieut. Kirby, U.S. Army
Lieut. Nuelsen, U.S.N.R. (later)

[Interrogator's Comment: We were doubtful of the importance of the five F.A. people. It was decided, however, to question these two further, PAETZEL as the only cryptanalyst in the group at Gluecksburg, and ODEN because he had something to do with machines]

I. PAETZEL

Q.39 Can you describe the inner Russian systems which you mentioned the other day?

PAETZEL: I did not work on them myself. They were clear text mixed with cover names.

Q.40 By whom were they used.

PAETZEL: By industrial plants, foundries, plane factories, armaments, machine works and so on.

Q.41 How much traffic was there?

PAETZEL: I don't know.

Q.42 Well, can you form any estimate? Was it one a day, 100 a day?

PAETZEL: It was rather heavy [Long pause] Possibly several hundred.

Q.43 What can you tell us about the Polish agent systems used in Czechoslovakia, that you mentioned?

PAETZEL: I did not work on them myself.

Q.44 Well, were they codes? Substitutions? Transpositions?

PAETZEL: They were not codes [Long cogitation, with involved statement which boiled down to a description of an aperiodic substitution, with the alphabet divided into sections, each having separate components. No information on the key].

Q.45 Have you ever worked on any cipher machines?

PAETZEL: Some time ago we broke the Swiss Enigma for a while, but only when it was improperly used. The same internal settings were used for a long time. After the inner settings changed we did not have any more solution.

Q.46 What was your method of solution?

PAETZEL: At first we reconstructed the wheels from cribs and from the fact that the inner setting remained the same. The messages had cliché beginnings.

Q.47 Did you ever break the Hagelin?

PAETZEL: The messages were never long enough.

Q.48 How long would they have to be?

PAETZEL: Perhaps 5,000 letters.

Q.49 What was the method?

PAETZEL: I don't know. I didn't work on it myself.

Q.50 What kind of traffic did you have?

PAETZEL: Swedish.

Q.51 Did you have Finnish?

PAETZEL: I think so. We had some cribs for one of those two at one time and broke in.

Q.52 Who would know the method?

PAETZEL: Regierungsrat KROEGER. He also did the Enigma work.

Q.53 What was your own work?

PAETZEL: I was the head of a section which dealt with systems which could not be delegated to the pure language sections because of their lack of time and personnel.

Q.54 Did you do cryptanalysis yourself?

PAETZEL: Seldom, as I was the boss.

Q.55 What have you worked on yourself lately?

PAETZEL: Spanish additives.

Q.56 Were you successful?

PAETZEL: Yes.

Q.57 Can you describe the systems?

PAETZEL: They differed according to traffic link. Each link had 10 tables, with 100 four-digit groups on each table. The indicator was the serial number [He did not know how it worked]. It came in the 2nd or 3rd place.

Q.58 Was it enciphered?

PAETZEL: I think it was in the clear, as it did not cause much difficulty.

Q.59 What other Spanish traffic did you break?

PAETZEL: None. Some links had more tables than others.

Q.60 What else have you worked on lately?

PAETZEL: Japanese.

Q.61 What was that like?

PAETZEL: It was a transposition with nulls over a two and four letter Code.

Q.62 What was the indicator system?

PAETZEL: It was rather complicated. I don't know.

Q.63 When did you work on this system?

PAETZEL: In the middle of 1943 [To ODEN: it was before the 1st of November, wasn't it?]

Q.64 What happened on the 1st of November?

PAETZEL: The whole establishment was completely destroyed by bombing.

Q.65 Where was this?

PAETZEL: In Berlin-Charlottenburg.

Q.66 Was the Japanese system read?

PAETZEL: Not currently.

Q.67 How late?

PAETZEL: We read it for about six months, but never currently.

Q.68 What other Japanese systems did you work on?

PAETZEL: We started to work on Japanese again in January 1945 but did not solve anything.

Q.69 What kind of system?

PAETZEL: We thought the system was basically the same.

Q.70 Did you work on Chinese traffic?

PAETZEL: Yes, but not towards the end. Some progress was made, but nothing was read.

Q.71 What about Manchukuo?

PAETZEL: It was worked on, but I know nothing about it.

Q.72 Yugoslavia?

PAETZEL: We had success with it.

Q.73 Tito or Mihailovic?

PAETZEL: I think it was Mihailovic.

Q.74 What kind of system was it?

PAETZEL: Five digit or five letter with dinome substitution of the corresponding positions of pairs of code groups. Probably five digit.

Q.75 What about Rumanian?

PAETZEL: The Rumanians were very conservative. They used a five digit code plus substitution. It was very, very simple.

Q.76 Greek?

PAETZEL: Just two plain codes were read.

Q.77 Bulgarian?

PAETZEL: The systems were basically a few five digit codes with re-paginations or relinections.

Q.78 Hungarian?

PAETZEL: They used an additive changing within the message. It was not solved.

Q.79 Arabian states, such as Saudi Arabia?

PAETZEL: We did not work on them. Does Saudi Arabia have its own systems? We did a little work on an Ethiopian code.

Q.80 Portuguese?

PAETZEL: They were five digit codes and we read them all.

Q.81 Did you work on any Latin American systems?

PAETZEL: We read all the Mexican and some smaller countries like Costa Rica, Paraguay, and Venezuela.

Q.82 What were the systems?

PAETZEL: Usually they were periodic substitutions. Mexico had codes.

II. ODEN

Q.83 What work did you do on the security of German cipher machines?

ODEN: None. I only worked on the maintenance of Forschungsamt communications.

Q.84 Did you have your own intercept stations?

ODEN: Yes.

Q.85 Where were they?

ODEN: They changed from time to time.

Q.86 Where were they on 1st January 1945?

ODEN: At TELPLIN, 70 km. North of Berlin; LUBBEN in the Spreewald, 65 km. South of Berlin. These were the main ones. There were others at COLOGNE, KONSTANZ, EUTIN, and GOLS near Vienna.

Q.87 How many sets?

ODEN: 100 to 150 at each of the first two; 20 to 30 at each of the others.

Q.88 How was the traffic forwarded?

ODEN: By cipher teleprinter.

Q.89 What model?

ODEN: T.52

Q.90 a, b, c, d, or e?

ODEN: c, d, and e.

Q.91 Did you develop your own intercept equipment?

ODEN: Usually not. We worked with the Army, the Reichspost and industry. We only got our own equipment if we felt we were not getting what we wanted.

Q.92 Did you work on the improvement of the T.52?

ODEN: Only as an engineer with Siemens/Halske before I came to FA. At FA I worked with others to some extent on their engineering weaknesses.

Q.93 Did you have liaison with Waprueef 7?

ODEN: Not formally. Some of its employees were classmates of mine.

[Comment: The interrogations have been put in question and answer form, as far as they can be reconstructed from our notes, in order to give some idea of the unsatisfactory nature of the replies. In fact, each reply of PAETZEL's required several restatements of the question in various forms, which we did not record, and was forthcoming only after long reflection.]

Geheime Reichssache!

Abteilung 5:	Sicherung
Leiter:	RR ~~[illegible]~~ Dr. Konke
Vertreter:	~~[illegible]~~
Hauptabteilung IV:	Geheimschriftwesen
Leiter:	Min.Dirig. S c h r o e d e r
Abteilung 6:	Geheimschriftwesen Auswärtiges Amt
Leiter:	ORR Dr. F a e t z e r
Abteilung 7:	Geheimschriftwesen Übersee, Südost
Leiter:	ORR W a e c h t e r
Abteilung 8:	Geheimschriftwesen West und Süd
Leiter:	ORR S c h u l z
Abteilung 9:	Geheimschriftwesen Ost, Südost, Süd
Leiter:	ORR [illegible]
Hauptabteilung V:	Nachrichtenleitung und Nachrichtenverbindungen
Leiter:	Min.Rat [illegible]
	Schlange (Amt Nachrichtenaufklärung) Dienststelle Berlin-Zehlendorf Ihlefeld [illegible]
Abteilung 10:	Nachrichtenverbindungen
Leiter:	MR Dr. [illegible]
Abteilung 11:	Außenpolitische Auswertung
Leiter:	ORR Dr. K r a b b e n.
Abteilung 12:	Wirtschaftsauswertung
Leiter:	mdGb Amg. B r i e s c h k e
Abteilung 13:	Innenpolitische Auswertung
Leiter:	RR R u n t z e n h i n
Hauptabteilung VI:	Technik
Leiter:	ORR Ing. [illegible]
	Schlange: ORR Dipl.Ing. [illegible] die Zweigstelle Berlin in Ziff. 2) leitet, vertritt ihn als VI in [illegible]
Abteilung 14:	Technik
Leiter:	ORR Dr. [illegible]
Zweigstelle Seifert in Berlin	Telegraphen-, Sonderschriften- [illegible] leiter:
Leiter:	Min.Rat L e i f e r t



16. III 45

- 2 -

3. Postanschrift.

Aus Gründen der Beschleunigkeit schreibe ich Ihnen künftighin weiterhin folgende Postanschrift für das Amt vor:

Für die Dienststelle Berlin, Fl Berlin und Marburg und die Verbindungsstellen

Reichsluftfahrtministerium - Forschungsamt

(1) Berlin-Charlottenburg 4
Schillerstr. 115/17

für alle übrigen Stellen

Reichsluftfahrtministerium - Forschungsamt

(13b) K a u f b e u r e n (Allg.)

Da zwischen Berlin und Kaufbeuren täglich Kurierverbindung besteht, ist dies zur Zt. die schnellste Art der Verbindung.

4. Verwaltungsmäßige Betreuung.

a) Die Dienststelle Seefart in Berlin wird verwaltungsmäßig der Zweigstelle Berlin angeschlossen.

b) Die Verbindungsstellen werden verwaltungsmäßig der Zweigstelle Berlin angeschlossen.

5. Befugnisse.

a) Der Leiter der Dienststelle Seefart in Berlin hat wie der Leiter der Zweigstelle Berlin die Befugnisse eines Abteilungsleiters gemäß der Geschäftsordnung.

b) Der Leiter der Zweigstelle Berlin hat wie bisher die Befugnisse eines Leiters einer Forschungsstelle gemäß der Geschäftsordnung.

gez. K o n a p e k

Beglaubigt:

Kühlenthal
Angestellte

Tgb.

1 2 Ri. A 9-4022

Kl.

Hptm.

4.5 Gr. Rb.

TOP SECRET

ORGANISATION OF REICHSLUFT... AMT 5 MIN. ...

Hptabt I — Organisation, Geheimhaltung, Muster, Statistik, Geschäftsverkehr etc.
Min. Rat. Borggrem

- **Abt 1** — Zentralabteilung, Abwehr, Wehrhaft, Luftschutz, Organisation, etc.
  ORR Rosenhahn, ORR Kunzmüller
- **Abt 2.** — Verwaltung

Hptabt II — Bearbeitung gelagenheiten der Gefolgschaftsmitglieder
ORR Kempe

- **Abt 3.** — Personalangelegenheiten
  ORR Kempe

Hptabt III — Erfassung, Auswertung, Sichtung
Min. Rat. Brauer

- **Abt 4.** — Erfassung
  RR Popp
- **Abt 5.** — Sichtung
  RR Dr. Henke

Hptabt IV — Geheimschriftwesen
Min. Dirig. Schroeder

- **Abt 6.** — Geheimschriftwesen Wissenschaft
  ORR Dr. Pokorny
- **Abt 7.** — Geheimschriftwesen Nordost, Südost
  ORR Hessler
- **Abt 8.** — Geheimschriftwesen West und Süd
  ORR Schulz (dead)
- **Abt 9.** — Geheimschriftwesen Ost, Südost, Mitte, Nord
  ORR Hensel
- **Abt 1...** — Nachrichtenaufklärung
  RR Dr. ...

...AHRTMINISTERIUM/FORSCHUNGSANT.

...LEITER
...R. SCHAPPER

Hptabt V — Nachrichtenleitung- und Auswertung
Min. Rat. Seifert

- **Abt 10.** — ...
  ...
- **Abt 11.** — ...politische Auswertung
  ORR Dr. Kurabach
- **Abt 12.** — Wirtschafts-Auswertung
  mWdFb Arg. Brieschke
- **Abt 13.** — Innenpolitische Auswertung
  RR Reutschler

Hptabt VI — Technik
ORR Dipl. Ing. Stabenow

- **Abt 14** — Technik
  ORR Dr. Huppertsberg
- **Abt 15.** — only known from Berlin telephone list not on Kaufbeuren org. list, and but on a distribution list.
  N.B. RR Odau listed as Chef Abteilung 15, is given elsewhere as i/c Betriebstechnik

4

15 (T)

CMH
Hq ALLIED CONTROL COUNCIL
Gluecksburg

11 June 1945

The four civilians listed below, in custody at Schloss Gluecksburg, were interrogated on 11 June 1945 by Lt. W.W. Pusey, USMR. All were formerly with the "Forschungsamt" of the German Air Force, and were transferred to 4SKL III under Captain Kupfer on 16 May 1945 where they worked until arrested on 23 May 1945. It is recommended that they be interrogated by whatever experts are working on 4SKL, and then be given into the custody of whoever takes care of German Air Force prisoners.

(1) Dr. Martin PANTZIL: formerly in the Forschungsamt, where he was in charge of a section devoted to breaking of codes since 1933.

(2) Regierungsrat Otto FINCKENAUT: formerly in the Forschungsamt, where he was in charge of the evaluation of information since 1937. Before then studied Scandinavian languages at Greifswald University.

(3) Regierungsrat Hoeckley ODEN: formerly in the Forschungsamt, where he was in charge of the technical apparatus. Since 1936 - before then with Siemens and Halske.

(4) Dr. Heinz KLAUTSCHE: formerly in the Forschungsamt, where he was in charge of dissemination of information to the various interested agencies. Since 1936. Before then studied business at various universities.

W. W. PUSEY, Lieut. USMR

15(7)

SOLY

SECRET

27/6.

SECRET HQ/Squadron
Allied Expedit Force (Rear).

Station Intelligence (Air Ops)
London.

1st June, 1945.

Ref. T.I. 19/Germany/1.

AIR PUBLICATION.

THE LUFTWAFFE RESEARCH ESTABLISHMENT.

1. GENERAL.

1. The Reichsforschungsrat, or Forschungsamt des RLM, has been the subject of much confusion. This is partly the result of the extreme secrecy in which it worked, and partly of the loose terminology used. Thus the FA has been confused with several research (Forschung) departments with which it has in fact no connection, and particularly (and most naturally) with the central technical research office or Reichsforschungsrat, which later came under the Reichsluftministerium with the title Reichsstelle für Forschung -führung des RLM. In fact the Forschungsamt is quite distinct from this office, and its confusing title should be regarded rather as a cover-name than as an indication of its functions.

2. Other reports have suggested, and it was at one time believed, that the FA was a secret cryptographical bureau of extraordinary ingenuity: but this also now seems to have been an error, perhaps due to the facts that the Luftwaffe had its own cryptographical service, and that the word Forschung has been used in this connection.

3. The following is a summary of such information about the Forschungsamt as is believed to be authentic by this office.

2. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT.

4. The Forschungsamt was an office of the Reichsluftministerium, and was known as Abteilung 4 of the RLM. Its connection with the RLM was however purely accidental, through the fact that it had been founded by, and had remained the personal property of, Hermann GOERING. It was founded in or shortly after 1933, and its principal and sole regular function was the tapping of telephone conversations, at first within the Reich, and later in occupied countries. It is said that GOERING's personal control of the FA was a serious loophole in HIMMLER's police system, and that the FA from time to time refused to monitor the telephone calls of persons whom GOERING had decided to protect. It is possible that its dependence on GOERING should be regarded as an historical survival from the time when, as Prime Minister of Prussia, GOERING exercised many of the repressive functions since centralised under HIMMLER.

5. The monitoring of telephones can however produce intelligence of more than purely police interest: and it has been stated that at one time GOERING had plans to convert the FA into his own foreign intelligence service, comparable with the bureaux of RIBBENTROP and HIMMLER. These plans are said to have included the employment of Major i.e. (Ger. L. .) Boehme, an able officer who had been head of the Ast. Hamburg, but had left the Abwehr in December 1942. This plan foundered: but the FA continued to collect every kind of intelligence, and was a supplier, not only of the RLM, but also of the Auswaertiges Amt, the SD, and the ministries of Economics and Propaganda; all of which had special officers appointed to deal with it. Indeed, competent sources have asserted that its most valuable work was for the Economics Ministry: and though much of its chief is said to have consisted of personal anti-Nazi gossip collected by its agents, an employee of its Hamburg branch had stated recently that, from an average point of view, the whole thing was a useful one, that progress in German business depended on telephones being tapped, and acted accordingly. In the sphere of political intelligence, it is also said that the FA tapped Il Duce's conversations at the time of the Italian Armistice, and an employee of the FA in Prague stated that the line Prague - Berlin received particular attention, and that the conversations of the U.S. Minister were tapped as a matter of course.

Stern W.

C. ORGANISATION.

6. Our knowledge of the organisation of the FA is very sparse. The Berlin HQ are said to have been (in October, 1944) in Hohillerstrasse 11(?)/13, Berlin-Charlottenburg 2. These HQ controlled regional groups of which one region is known to have consisted of North western Europe (including Norway, Denmark and North Germany) with HQ at Hamburg and another of France and Belgium and HQ at Paris. Control by Berlin was highly centralised, and all instructions (except in case of danger to the Fuehrer or to Germany) had to come as orders from Berlin. Communications with the Berlin office were by secret cipher-teleprinter (G - Schreiber). Both civilian telecommunications and service personnel were employed as officers in the FA, and monitoring personnel were drawn from OKW/Wehrmachtnachrichten/Dolmetscher-Truppe, Abteilung, which also supplied interpreters and monitors to the Wehrmacht and the Abwehr.

D. REGIONAL NETS.

7. The regional area for North western Europe was controlled from Hamburg, where there was a Forschungsleitstelle (situation on the top floor of the Hauptpostamt (Nebenstelle) controlling the following Forschungsstellen:

Hamburg
Stettin
Bremen
Koeln-Deutz
Dortmund
Wetzlar
Utlandshorn
Copenhagen
Oslo
Trondhjem

The employees of this network were civilian Nachrichtenhelferinnen, and were able to describe themselves as working for the RBD.

8. The regional area France/Belgium was controlled from Berlin, from HQ in the General Telephone Exchange, rue des Archives, and included the following numbered branch offices:

1. Paris.
2. Nancy.
3. Lille.
4. Brussels.
5. Dijon.
6. Bayonne (a sub-office of Bordeaux).
7. Bordeaux.

After the total occupation of France in December 1942, an eighth branch-office was established at Lyons, and a ninth planned (but never completed) at Marseilles. The military personnel of this network (there were also civilian Nachrichtenhelferinnen) were described as belonging to the 4/6 Fernsprechkompanie, whose HQ was Paris; and the salary in the following was :-

[illegible]
Feldpost [illegible].

9. Presumably the regional organisation in the Low Countries was on the same lines as in the west.

[illegible]

[illegible]	[illegible]
Chief (Under Lecture)	RM [illegible]
[illegible] (Chief Ctl. G-3)	70
[illegible] (Chief Ctl G-2)	[illegible]
[illegible] (Col. [illegible]	10
Chief Adj.	2
[illegible] Unit	2

[illegible] their own

AS REQUESTED BY COMDR. DUDLEY-SMITH, R.N.

THIS IS EXTRACTED FROM THE FINAL REPORT OF H.M.S. TIGER — UNMODIFIED

TOP SECRET "U"

Appendix 2.

RLM/FORSCHUNGSAMT, KAUFBEUREN

I. General Survey

On Wednesday, 9 May, the whole of TICOM team 1 under W/Cdr. Oeser visited the airfield at Kaufbeuren. There they inspected some buildings which had formerly belonged to the airfield staff, but which now contained evidence of occupation by some signals unit. Information of this had been given by Major Dunn, S.I. 7 Army, who had placed it under a guard consisting of Lt. Buehler, 3260 R.I.Coy. and two Sig. Corps enlisted men.

These barracks were being used to house German P/W's. Displaced persons had also made their home there, and before the occupation by U.S. troops, they had housed a Flak unit. Moreover, as later interrogations showed, the RLM/FA had been disbanded before the Americans arrived, and all documents burned. It is not surprising therefore that the site had been rather denuded of useful equipment and documents.

The buildings formerly occupied by RLM/FA consisted of six blocks directly opposite the entrance gate to the airfield. These had later been handed over to the German signals unit. They were searched on the morning of May 9th. The search produced few documents. But among them was a directive signed Schapper, Min. Dir., which disclosed that the buildings had been occupied by Reichsluftfahrtministerium/Forschungsamt, and gave a complete table of organisation of the Amt. Since practically no information about this organisation had been available to source, the nature of its operations was very imperfectly known. The organisation document, however, showed that "Forschung" might include cryptography, as Section IV dealt with "Geheimschriftwesen".

The building was thereupon gone over more carefully on the afternoon of May 9th and on May 10th. From cards removed from the doors, coupled with the known organisation, a good picture was obtained of the location of the various sub-sections. Remains of a card-index were found which appeared to be based on monitored telephone conversations. No further documents were found.

Equipment: The telephones and teleprinters were in Block 10. There were also radio receivers, Sturgeon machines of the normal type, magnetic tape recorders, and at least five Hollerith machines uncrated but obviously unused. In Block 11 there was a large amount of new photographic material and equipment.

Further information was obtained in Kaufbeuren by interrogating people formerly employed by the Forschungsamt. These confirmed:

(a) that Hauptabteilung IV at least included cryptographers, of whom ORR Paetzel was the chief, and that Abt. 8 dealt with France, Italy, the Vatican, Rumania, Belgium, Switzerland, and that it was particularly interested in Wirtschaft and Politik.

(b) that Abteilung 10 of Hptabt. V did translations.

(c) that a large number of the messages translated was commercial in content.

(d) that the organisation was responsible to Goering via Staatssekretär Dr. Koerner and that its head, Dr. Schapper, held a rank equivalent to that of Generalleutnant der Luftwaffe.

No further information could be obtained, and after the magnetic tape recorders had been despatched to Col. Bicher, the target was abandoned.

On May 21, however, information reached TICOM team 1 via C.I.C. 215 Rosenheim that Gottfried Schapper had been apprehended and sent to 7 Army. Rushworth, who was waiting in Augsburg with the BAUDOT gear, was able to sit in on the interrogation of Schapper on May 29. On May 30th Erwin Rentschler, in charge of Abteilung 13 was interrogated by 7 Army interrogators in the presence of Norland, and further interrogated in the presence of Rushworth and Norland on May 31.

These two P/W's were able to give a fair amount of information as to the working of Forschungsamt, though Schapper's information was very sketchy on details. Their statements are attached to this appendix.

Also attached is the original Schapper document reduced to a more easily intelligible genealogical table.

II. Report by Maj. Rushworth on Min. Dir. Schapper

Gottfried Schapper is a small, rather pleasant man, with rather ingenuous blue eyes. He had a short beard during his residence in Augsburg; this may, however, be due to the fact that C.I.C. pulled him in without giving him time to bring a razor with him. He is a widower with one son who was eleven years old on May 30. He was desperately anxious to give us all the assistance he could; the reason for this was, he explained, a sincere desire to cooperate with the Allies for the promotion of world peace. Had his arrest taken place while the fighting was still going on, he assured us that he would not have uttered a word. Unfortunately, in spite of his desire to help, he appears, like all the heads of organisations examined by TICOM personnel, to have had almost no knowledge of details. One gets the impression that he was rather old-world, and that this had its effect on his organisation. He rather lived in the last war, in fact. On the other hand, he claims that he wished his organisation to become a general intelligence bureau at the commencement of this war, but that his competitors - the Foreign Office and OKW/Chi - refused to cooperate. He professed a willingness to cooperate with Oberst Ketteler, which he said was not reciprocated. Perhaps the fact that this was Göring's private cryptographic bureau had something to do with the lack of cooperation.

A few points are worth noticing:

1) Intercept stations were located at Lübben and Templin near Berlin, at Breslau, Köln, Konstanz, and Eutin.

2) The Forschungsamt did not listen to press broadcasts.

3) They always took new stations until they had enough traffic to identify them; if they were service stations the information was passed to the appropriate branch of the service concerned.

4) Paetzel's department (Abt. 6) was entirely research and dealt with Sonderverfahren.

5) The other departments were divided according to "language families".

6) The Hollerith machinery found in Kaufbeuren was used by Hauptabteilung IV but "only for statistics".

7) The chief effort of the department was on diplomatic, though a lot of commercial traffic was read, "as the codes were easy". As to cryptographic success, details were lacking. They did very well with Polish and Turkish, and with the smaller countries, e.g. Balkans, and South America. They had no success at all with Russian, "not as much as they would have liked" with British and U.S. They took Jap, but were only occasionally able to break it, and had only one Jap decoder.

8) Reported messages were sent to following offices:-

1) Innenministerium (for Kaltenbrunner)
2) Auswärtiges Amt
3) Wirtschaftsministerium
4) Reichsm. für Volksaufklärung u. Propaganda
5) O.K.W.

9) Hauptabteilung VI (Technik) dealt with maintenance and repairs of machinery, obtaining machinery, exploitation of captured machinery.

10) The department only worked on hand cyphers and never attempted machine keys.

III. Report by Lt. S.S.Norland on R.R.Rentschler

May 30, 1945

Regierungsrat ERWIN RENTSCHLER has been associated with RLM/FA from 1934 until the organisation ceased to function only a few days before V-E day. RLM/FA was created by Goering in order that he might have his own means of obtaining information in case the other agencies should at some later date attempt to keep such information from him. The organisation was located in Berlin, Charlottenburg, Schillerstrasse, until it was bombed out on 7/7/44. Most of the unit then moved to Breslau, where it remained until the Russian advance occasioned a second move to Kaufbeuren, in February of this year. Constant air attacks at Kaufbeuren resulted in a further move to Rosenheim in April but the organisation never resumed work after this last move.

In Berlin RLM/FA probably employed about 1500-2000 persons. Rentschler could only estimate its size. A considerable portion of these migrated to Breslau, although a few departments (Abt.VI) remained in Berlin and others were reduced by the drafting of personnel into the Armed Forces. Approximately 450 people moved to Kaufbeuren. The Rosenheim party included the head of RLM/FA, Schapper, and approximately 100 men.

RLM/FA consisted of VI main Abteilungen with 15 different sections, as follows:

I - Administration
1. Administration

II - Personnel
2. Personnel
3. Treasury

III - Technical
4. Charting of communication lines
5. Dissemination of news

IV - Decoding
6. Research
7. Overseas & Southeast
8. West and South
9. East, S.E., Centre, North

V - Evaluation - Min.Rat. Seifert
10. Library and registration - Dr. Mews
11. Foreign Affairs - Dr. Kurzbach
12. Commercial - Dr. Rautenkranz
13. Internal Affairs - R.R. Rentschler

VI - Technical Development
14. Development of own machines
15. Comparison and evaluation of captured machinery

Until 1944 Rentschler was the French expert in Abteilung 11, in 1944 he became the head of Abteilung 13. While still in Berlin Abteilung 13 employed about 80 people. After the various moves and Armed Forces drafts, however, they were only 16 men and 4 girls left in all of Main Abteilung V when it reached Rosenheim.

Material which reached Main Abteilung V for evaluation came either from Abteilung 5 or Main Abteilung IV, depending upon whether it had been received in plain language or in code or cipher. Material from the De- coding Abteilung came to Abteilung V already translated while clear text material came as it was received, except for Japanese and other non- European languages which also were translated into German by experts. Abteilung 10 included 5 or 6 translaters of European languages and Rent- schler said that nearly everyone, at least in his section, could handle French and English.

Most of the material sent to Main Abteilung V was obtained from plain language sources; foreign radio, foreign press, telephone and tele- graph messages to and from both foreign and occupied countries, and internal communications. The quantity of decoded material varied with the various sections of Main Abteilung V: in Abteilung 11 perhaps 30% of the total was decoded traffic, 40 % clear text and another 30% from radio broadcasts and the press; in Abteilung 12 a considerably smaller percen- tage consisted of decoded material; in Abteilung 13 only about 7-8% of the total came from decodes.

By agreement with OKW absolutely no military codes and ciphers were handled by RLM/FA. When asked how such material could be distin- guished from that which was their commitment, , Rentschler stated that the initial group indicated the sort of material. Most of the decoded traffic was diplomatic and there was in addition some success with commerdial codes. Rentschler insisted that nothing could be done with top-grade Russian, English and American diplomatic codes. French (Vichy period; de Gaulle uses Allied codes and consequently his diplomatic traffic is not read) was the easiest to break, since Vichy changed its code only about every four weeks. Some success with Italian, Turkish and Japanese. None with Sweden. The Swiss used hardly any diplomatic wireless channels. Second, third and fourth grade English diplomatic could be read but pro- duced nothing. Communications between British consul in Cairo and London could be read.

Most decoded traffic was read about 2-3 days after it was sent, with some up to a week old. Apparently only Japanese traffic was read up to 4 or 5 weeks old. Rentschler professed almost complete ignorance of the workings of Main Abteilung IV, which was guarded by very rigid and strictly enforced security regulations.

The finished product of Main Abteilung V was automatically sent to Goering and by agreement to whatever other agencies were concerned with the particular matter in hand. The Foreign Office received quite a lot of the output, as did Dr. Speer.

Rentschler was very cooperative and apparently had no reservations about telling all he knew.

Min. Rat Seifert apparently remained in Berlin and Rentschler knows nothing about his present whereabouts or whether a northern branch of RLM/FA was ever set up. Mews and Kurzbach were in Kaufbeuren when Rentschler departed for Rosenheim but had left there when the latter walked back to Kaufbeuren a few days later to get his clothing. Rauten- kranz is in the Seventh Army cage in Augsburg.

On May 31 Rentschler was taken up on specific points of the pre- vious day's interrogation. Abteilungen 11-13 reported on an average 80 messages a day, including decodes and P/L (Klartext). They were given all texts, and then separated reportable from non-reportable. Abteilung 11, the one dealing with traffic of interest to the Foreign Office, re- ported perhaps 20-30 messages a day. This is interesting in view of

Schapper's statement that this office put their main cryptographic effort into diplomatic ciphers.

Questioned about success on British diplomatic ciphers, P/W was very vague. He had in fact seen only one message from the British consul in Cairo to London, and could not say whether this traffic had been read regularly. As to U.S. diplomatic, he knew that quite a lot of the traffic from Harrison in Berne to Washington had been read, he believed up till recently. His impression is that this did not include the highest grade information, but messages about, for example, the situation in Germany, signed but not written by Harrison. He does not think that any other links were read. They also read British and U.S. commercial messages, some concerned with ship's movements. These were mainly about individual ships; convoy information was not dealt with by his office.

IV. Translation of write-up by Schapper. The 'Research Bureau' (Forschungsamt, abbreviated FA)

Augsburg 1.6.45.

1)Founded: April 1933

2) Reasons for the foundation: My work in the Cipher Bureau of the Reichswehr Ministry (1927-1933) had shown me the incompetence of the methods employed there, so that I, with several colleagues, resigned from it and proposed to GOERING the formation of an Intelligence Bureau for the Reich Government that should be free of departmental ties and extraneous influences.

3) Name: GOERING consented, and only requested the camouflaging of the bureau under the name Reichsluftfahrtministerium-Forschungsamt (Reich Air Ministry, Research Bureau). My request, that we should however, be independent of the Air Ministry, was granted: the Bureau became independent, with its own administration and establishment; it was also not subordinated to the Reich Air Ministry (Staatssekretär MILCH), but allocated for supervision to Staatssekretär KOERNER of the Prussian Ministry of State; finance was regulated directly from the Treasury (Finanzhof).

4) Nature of the Bureau: The Bureau was consequently a civilian institution. For reasons of security a small number of its officials was put into G.A.F. uniform as Armed Forces Officials for the duration of the war. This was done only with those officials who had to cooperate with outside authorities.

The Research Bureau (FA) restricted itself to intercepting and processing signals that could not be intercepted by technical devices. In this, it did not participate in the procuring of military intelligence, (which was the responsibility of OKW), nor with intelligence from agents, as I held agent material to be too unreliable and likely to prejudice our own reliable intelligence.

5) Organisation of the FA: Accordingly, the FA was composed as follows:

Organisation and Tasks:

a) Director (Chef): Management of official business.

Section (Hauptabt.) I: Organisation: Established Personnel; Administration.
Subsection (Abt.) 1: Organisation: internal and external security; secrecy; A.R.P.
Subsection 2: Admin.

Section II: Personnel.
Subsection 3: Personnel (unestablished).

Section III: Interception and signals routine.
Subsection 4: Employment of interception forces, interception planning and interception tasks; control of interception routine.
Subsection 5: Sorting of intercepted signals and their distribution to Sections IV and V (q.v.)

Section IV: Codes and Ciphers; Deciphering.
Subsection 6: Scientific preparation of working documents and basic principles for deciphering.
Subsetion 7: Anglo-American and other related languages and cipher procedures.
Subsection 8: Slavonic ditto
Subsection 9: Oriental languages and cipher procedures. Also other languages.

Section V: Exploitation of signals; routing.
Subsection 10: Distribution, duplication, registering and filing of signals.
Subsection 11: Intelligencing for foreign policy.
Subsection 12: Intelligencing for economic policy.
Subsection 13: Intelligencing for home policy. Other intelligencing, e.g. Propaganda, Food, Labour, Traffic (i.e. railways, etc), Police.

Section VI: Signals Technology.
Subsection 14: Development and supply of equipment.
Subsection 15: Maintenance technology.

b) Liaison stations. The FA had one liaison officer with each of the following - the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Economics, the Propaganda Ministry, OKW, and the Reich Main Security Office (RSHA). The duties of these liaison officers were to deliver to these authorities the relevant signals from us, to make any necessary explanation of them, and to receive instructions.

c) Outstations: In the Reich, and also in occupied territory, there were the Intercept Stations, which were grouped together by 11 districts under Control Stations. These included:-

W/T Intercept Stations
Broadcast Intercept Stations
Telegram " "
Telephone " " (Landline intercept)
T.P. " " (" ")
Postal Censorship Stations. (" ")

d) The tasks of the FA are clear from Paragraph 5, a to c: they therefore consisted of: Interception, Processing (Deciphering, Exploitation) and publication to relevant Reich authorities of signals having importance for diplomacy, external and home policy, economic policy, cultural, propaganda, food, labour, traffic and police policy, these signals being interceptable by technical devices.

Signals thus obtained were processed in a strictly objective manner and passed to the relevant Reich authorities. It was no part of the duties of the Bureau to make independent deductions, to estimate the value of the contents, or to make recommendations for action.

The landline portion of the work (telephone, telegram and letter interception) was, on my recommendation, handed over at the beginning of 1945 to the Reich Main Security Office (RSHA), as in course of time political interception had become much less important than police interception on account of the military and traffic situation.

6) Development of the FA. This did not proceed in accordance with the original plan. It soon became evident that the unification of all intelligence services (especially the principal ones, e.g. that of the Foreign Office and the Political Intelligence Service of OKW) with that of the FA was being wrecked by the departmental interests of these authorities. (Translator's note: a few words seem to have been omitted from the following sentence, but the sense is clearly as follows). Thus there arose a constant and very harmful competition between these, which had the specific effect of preventing the FA from developing into a centralised intelligence organisation for the Reich High Command, such as are possessed by America and Great Britain, and thus the FA could not take its proper place alongside the Foreign Office and OKW, as was originally expected.

1933-43: FA in Berlin.
December 43 - January 45:--after the Bureau was bombed out in Berlin--in Breslau.
February 45 - April 45, in Kaufbeuren or on the march, disbanding of the Bureau, destruction of archives and documents, dispersal of remainder of employees. A part of the FA had remained in the north of the Reich.

Signed: SCHAPPER.

Forschungsamt (Translation)

Curriculum Vitae of the former Ministerialdirektor GOTTFRIED SCHAPPER.

Born 16.12.1888 in Groszmoeringen, Kreis Stendal, son of the Evangelical pastor Dr. Karl Schapper.
Schools. Elementary school, Classical High School, matriculation certificate 1910.
1910: Fahnenjunker and Lieut. in Railway Regt. No. 2.
1913: Transferred to Signals.
1914-1918: in the First World War: O.C. Heavy W/T Station 15 in the West with AOK 5 (Crown Prince).
In the East with G.K. X (Emmich)
" 1 Inf. Div. (Konta)
" 11 Bavarian Inf. Div. (Kneupel)
" AOK Linsingen.
" " Southeast (Balkans) with O.K. Mackensen as O.C. Deciphering Station Balkans.

1916-1917: O.C. Wireless Section High Command of the Army at G.H.Q. and Director of the Cryptographic Bureau (Geheimwissenschaftl. Abt.) of the High Command of the Army. (Interception, Deciphering, Intelligencing of all military and political signals interceptable by technical devices.)
1918: Divisional Signals Commander with various divisions in the West.
1919: Discharged with rank as Captain.
1919-1920: Married: fell into the hands of revolutionary swindlers, without work or food, harried by communists, sold newspapers and other things on the streets; did odd jobs to ward off starvation.
1920: Secretary of the National Society of Berlin for Rescuing the Reich from the Revolution. Took part in the Kapp-Ludendorff Putsch; persecuted by communists; moved to Munich.
1920-1927: in Munich. Various jobs as business manager of National organisations, of clubs, businesses and newspapers.
1920-1923: Member of the N.S.D.A.P., resigned after the Putsch of 1923.
1927-1933: In Berlin. Administrative Officer and Head of Department in the Cryptographic Bureau of the Reichswehr Ministry. Resigned 1933, as I could not agree with the thoroughly incompetent methods of the Cryptographic bureau. Therefore,
1933-April 1945 I went over to Goering, whom I knew well from the First World War; founding of the Forschungsamt (see my report on the Forschungsamt): Head of Subsection, then Head of Section, and from 1944 director of this Bureau.
1931: joined the Nazi Party, and remained a simple member of it until April 1945.
1933-37 or 38: member of the Allgemeine SS, from which I resigned, as they refused to recognise my Christian philosophy of life.
1934: A son was born to me.
1939-45: Employment of the Forschungsamt in the Second World War, under my direction, first as deputy head, then independently from
1944: at first in Berlin, after the bombing out in Breslau and subsequently in Kaufbeuren.
April 1945: Release and residence in Soellbrunn-Niederwäll near Rosenheim.
May: Arrested by CIC, interrogation in Rosenheim, imprisonment and interrogation in Salsburg, then captivity in Augsburg.

SECRET

EXTRACTS

6824 DIC (MIS)/M.1136

23 Apr 45

GERMAN SIGNALS COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE,

SIGNALS AND OTHER INFORMATION

I. SOURCES

Name	:	KERSTEN, Friedrich	ERXLEBEN, Hans
Rank	:	Generalleutnant	Generalmajor
Unit	:	None. Retired	Commandant, KASSEL
Captured	:	7 Apr 45	4 Apr 45
Interrogated	:	6824 DIC (MIS), 19 Apr 45	6824 DIC (MIS), 19 Apr 45

II. PREAMBLE

A. Generalleutnant KERSTEN

This PW has been a soldier all his life and had been retired at the time the Americans entered his present home, BAD OEYHAUSEN. He had been a Signals Officer since the last war, primarily on the administrative side, and was Chief Signals Officer (HOEHERER NACHRICHTEN FUEHRER) in FRANCE from Apr 41 to Sep 43. He was in command of all PW camps and administration in WEHRKREIS XI from 1 Dec 43 to Nov 44. He was then transferred to the Officers Reserve (FUEHRERRESERVE). On 1 Apr 45 he was retired and settled down to pensioned civilian life in BAD OEYHAUSEN. He donned his uniform and reported voluntarily to the Americans after they had entered the town.

Estimate of Reliability: C-2

B. Generalmajor ERXLEBEN

PW is likewise a regular Army Officer, attended Cadet School as a youth and has spent his entire life in the army. He is a telephone specialist. Until fall 43, he was in FRANCE as Signals General of Southern FRANCE (NACHRICHTEN FUEHRER SUEDFRANKREICH). He then became Chief Signals General (HOEHERER NACHRICHTEN FUEHRER) of z.b.V. 513, a signals unit originally destined to set up communications in LENINGRAD, once the city was captured, but which then stayed on in the Northern Russian Sector. From Aug 44, to capture, he was Commandant in KASSEL.

Estimate of Reliability: C-3

III. RESEARCH BUREAU OF THE GERMAN AIR MINISTRY (FORSCHUNGSAMT DES REICHSLUFTFAHRTMINISTERIUMS)

PW KERSTEN gave the following information on the background of this Bureau:

In the early thirties a good friend of his named SCHEET (see Para VII, personalities), at that time a captain in the Armed Forces Signals Intercept office (CHI-STELLE DES REICHSWEHRMINISTERIUMS), asked his advice about leaving this office to enter a new organization in the German Air Ministry, SCHEET's health was none too good, a definite disadvantage to a successful army career,

Please turn over.

and he had been promised promotion to REGIERUNGSRAT, etc. in the new organisation. He subsequently made the change to the German Air Ministry, the above Research Bureau and was, by 1939, MINISTERIALRAT.

The title, Research Bureau of the German Air Ministry, was a blind. The real mission of the Bureau was signals intercept work of a counter-intelligence nature. PW ERXLEBEN stated that the mission of this Bureau was to watch over civilian and military communications, primarily in a technical sense. The Bureau has its own signals net and, he assumed, its own codes. He is also convinced, though without definite proof, that HIMMLER has a similar counter-intelligence intercept organisation, as he has known of cases where telephone lines of generals, ministries, etc. have been tapped.

PW KERSTEN, while Chief Signal Officer in FRANCE to Sep 43, had under his administrative control a special unit that worked in close conjunction with the Research Bureau. This unit was called the FERNSPRECH BETRIES KOMPANIE (Telephone Operating Company), believed to be numbered 634 and certainly in the 600 series. The personnel of this Co, 200 - 250 men, was under the military control of Cap. von BOECZY (see Para VII, Personalities). These men were all educated, spoke fluent French, and came to the unit through an Army Interpreter Replacement Co wearing the yellow arms colour.

This Co was broken up and placed in the main telephone centres in FRANCE (PARIS, LILLE, BORDEAUX, DIJON, LYON) where they monitored long-distance phone lines and took notes on conversations overheard. They could cut into all lines at will. With each such group were 1 to 3 civilians of the Research Bureau of the German Air Ministry. These civilians controlled the work of the monitors, made assignments, and evaluated and disseminated the information thus obtained. The PW, for instance, only received that information from this source which pertained to his work, and nothing else. The civilians in charge had direct teletype connections with BERLIN. All directives to the civilians came directly from the Research Bureau.

The work was highly classified. In Apr 41, the senior civilian (addressed only as Mister), in charge of the Research Bureau's monitoring, gave PW KERSTEN a numbered pamphlet entitled "Directive for the Activity of the Research Bureau"(ANWEISUNGEN FUER DIE TAETIGKEIT DES FORSCHUNGAMTES) classified GEHEIME REICHSSACHE. This same civilian, name unknown, demanded the return of this directive in Sep 43 when PW was transferred. PW had given the pamphlet to his adjutant who had been transferred East and there killed in action, and the pamphlet could not be found. PW repeatedly feared a court martila because of this loss, and it was not till the end of 1944 that the whole affair was quashed.

IV. GERMAN SIGNALS NETS

Both PW were interrogated at length on the possibility of a future German underground maintaining secret communications channels within the present German cable network or setting up a network of its own. Both PW discounted the possibility of either* PW ERXLEBEN stated that all long-distance cables would have to run through repeater stations and could be easily controlled there.

* and

PW KERSTEN stated that the German cable net had been functioning to the very end, with minor disturbances, and could be repaired easily and quickly. He suggested enlisting the aid of such cable experts as the TELEGRAPHENBAUFUEHRER, in case the head engineers are no longer available.

Please turn over

A great deal of Party politics has crept into the German REICHSPOST since the Nazis took over. Dr. OHNESORGE, German Minister of Postal Services, is an old-time Nazi and has favoured Party men everywhere. This has embittered well-trained and capable men who have seen Party favourites receive more rapid promotion. Such would be only too ready to point out Party men to the American forces. Inversely, anyone who had been promoted rapidly and had jumped men above him would be suspect. PW ERXLEBEN does not believe any prepared underground infiltration of the REICHSPOST has been effected.

PW ERXLEBEN stated that the German electric plants use their high-tension lines for an administrative communications net, using low-frequency carrier equipment. This net existed before the war and runs over into SWITZERLAND.

15(T)

SECRET

Goes to Seaman Section V DD(CSA).

7.7.45

Ref No 708
29 Jan 45

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH ARMY
MU 500, CSDIC, G-2

APO 758 US ARMY

GERMAN "AIR MINISTRY" RESEARCH OFFICE

SOURCE

GUENTHER, Lothar, Pvt, 1 Co, 103 Regt, 407 VOLKSGRENADIER Div. A 39-year old jurist who was employed in the Reich Air Ministry Research Office from 1937 until his induction in October 44. Fearing reprisals against his family, he at first refused to divulge any information. He proved, however, very cooperative in the end. Source is anti-Nazi and a typical German intellectual.

Rating: B-2 Date of Inf: Oct 44 Interrogator: W.M.B.

FORSCHUNGSAMT DES REICHLUFTFAHRTMINISTERIUMS (German Air Ministry Research Office)

a) History and Purpose

The Research Office was created by GOERING in 1933. Despite its name, the work of the office is not connected in any way with the activities of the Air Ministry. The FORSCHUNGSAMT collects all foreign news through newspapers, periodicals, publications, telephone and radio. This latter means is by far the most important way of gathering information. PW states that more material is collected by this office than by the Propaganda Ministry or any other single organization. While the functions of the Research Office and the Propaganda Ministry coincide to a certain point, the Propaganda Ministry uses the information gathered for its own purposes, whereas the Research Office disseminates all material it obtains. All government offices, aswell as high ranking Nazi personalities, including HITLER, GOERING et al, down to GAULEITER, are on the Research Office's distribution lists. The Office disseminates its information in its original form, without propaganda additions or comments.

Occasionally the Research Office is requested to work on special matters by the Gestapo or the ABWEHR.

While it was rumored that HIMMLER had serious intentions to take over the FORSCHUNGSAMT, GOERING always managed to retain control of the Office.

Until July 7 44 the main offices of the FORSHUNGSAMT were located at BERLIN-CHARLOTTENBURG, SCHILLERSTRASSE. After the building was destroyed as a result of Allied air raids the offices moved to a FLAKKASERNE in BRESLAU.

b) Organization and Scope of Operations

The FORSCHUNGSAMT is divided into six Departments, designated as follows:

I Office of the Director and his Staff
II Transportation and Guards
III Radio and Telephone
IV Decoding
V Economic Dept.
VI Administration (Personnel, Finance, etc.)

All of Germany and occupied territories are divided into four main regions to which are assigned Main Research Posts (FORSCHUNGSLEITSTELLEN) in BERLIN, BRESLAU, VIENNA and HAMBURG. These main Research Posts in turn control Research Posts (FORSCHUNGSSTELLEN), only an incomplete and not up-to-date- list of which is known to PW, including posts in DANZIG, BRESLAU, HAMBURG, COLOGNE, MUNICH; VIENNA, NUERNBERG, STETTIN, LEBA/Pomerania, KOENIGSBERG, RIGA and TALLINN.

The FORSCHUNGSAMT has approx six radio receiving stations covering all frequencies. The ones known to PW are located in LUEBBEN/SPREEWALD, LEBA/Pomerania, KONSTANZ, COLOGNE and BRESLAU.

The FORSCHUNGSAMT has about 1,000 employees. The personnel in each Research Post numbers 10-20; the number of people employed in a Main Research Post is unknown to source. All linguists are Germany's best. They understand perfectly the accents and slang vocabularies of the foreign languages they are familiar with, and are invariably people who have spent years abroad.

The economic Dept is the largest of all FORSCHUNGSAMT sections. Here a staff of experts of various branches of industry sort and evaluate information pertaining to the activities of the world market, production of all possible goods, statistics, etc. Of particular interest,was, of course, the armament industry in the United States and England. Stock exchange rumors and fluctuations in foreign countries. were also very closely watched and collected to enable quick and advantageous decisions to be made for buying and selling.

Statistics of industrial interest gathered by this Dept were also sometimes disseminated to certain German industrial institutions.

A close watch was kept on broadcasting stations all over the world. Foreign and domestic telephone lines and cables were tapped. The LONDON-BASEL and LONDON-BERLIN lines, for instance, are know to PW to have been tapped. A special listening office in BERLIN and the various Research Posts overheard all telephone conversations and recorded all coded messages. Of special interest were foreign diplomatic conversations and coded messages, which it sometimes took as long as six months to decipher. (In this connection PW states that the Russian codes were considered the most difficult to decipher).

Telephone conversations of German Industrial establishments were also watched and listened to by the Research Posts. PW claims that this procedure proved helpful in overcoming industrial bottlenecks, especially in the armament industry.

The listening posts in the FORSCHUNGSSTELLEN were not permitted to listen in on conversations of people prominent in the Nazi hierarchy. A special office in BERLIN, called the "GIFTKUECHE" ("Poison Kitchen"), was assigned to this type of work.

Research Posts were organized in all territories occupied by Germany. Source worked in RIGA for some time, where political affairs only were watched and where the main purpose of the office was to listen in on conversations and report on activities of the puppet government of Latvia. Another office was located in TALLINN. Source heard that similar offices were organized in France and Belgium. In Poland, source states, the Germans took over wire-tapping installations of the pre-war Polish government which were technically superior to those of the Germans.

c) Security Measures

The name, Air Ministry Research Office, implying preoccupation with matters pertaining to aviation research, was devised to conceal the real activities of the Office. Great precaution has and is being taken to retain the secrecy of the Office. All employees of the FORSCHUNGSAMT had to swear not to reveal any of the activities of the Office under threat of extreme penalty. Even in relations between the various Departments of the FORSCHUNGSAMT the air of secrecy is carefully maintained. Almost all material originating from the Office is classified "GEHEIME SACHE" (Secret Matter) or "GEHEIME REICHSSACHE" (Secret Reich Matter). A special Department listens to conversations and watches the movements of all employees of the FORSCHUNGSAMT and its sub-departments.

d) Personalities

SCHAPPER, MINISTERIALDIRIGENT, in charge of the FORSCHUNGSAMT BERLIN. His predecessor was Prince von HESSEN who died in the fall of 1944.

BREUER, MINISTERIALRAT, in charge of Dept III

SCHROEDER, OBERREGIERUNGSRAT, in charge of Dept IV.

SCHADE, in charge of FORSCHUNGSSTELLE DANZIG.

SEIFERT, MINISTERIALRAT, in charge of Dept V.

RAUTENKRANZ, DR. REGIERUNGSRAT, in charge of FORSCHUNGSLEITSTELLE BRESLAU.

29 January 1945. MU 500, CSDIC, SEVENTH ARMY

(signed)

PAUL KUBALA, Maj. MI.,
Commanding.